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INTRODUCTION

The Victim and Witness Protection Act of 19821 (VWPA) contains
restitution provisions2 that require convicted criminals to compensate
their victims to the greatest extent possible for injury or loss resulting
from the offense. 3 Congress recognized that convicted criminals are
often sued in subsequent civil proceedings for damages arising out of
the offense committed. To obviate the necessity of requiring the victim
to establish the criminal's liability, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. §
3580(e), which provides that:
A conviction of a defendant for an offense involving the Act
giving rise to restitution under this section shall estop the
defendant from denying the essential allegations of that offense in any subsequent Federal civil proceeding or State
civil proceeding, to the
extent consistent with State law,
4
brought by the victim.
In 1984, the Florida legislature also recognized the need to alleviate
the victim's burden of establishing the convicted criminal's liability in
a subsequent civil suit for damages, and enacted Florida Statutes
section 775.089(8). This section is almost identical to its federal counterpart and provides:

1. Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248 (1982) (codified as amended in scattered sections of

18 U.S.C. & FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(2)) [hereinafter VWPA or Act].
2. 18 U.S.C. § 3579-80 (1982) (renumbered18 U.S.C. 88 3663-64 (1987) (effective Nov. 1,
1987)). In addition to restitution, the VWPA has two major provisions. First, the Act strengthens
the criminal and civil protections accorded to crime victims and witnesses against harassment
and intimidation. 18 U.S.C. 88 1512-15 (1982). Second, in order to assess the effect of the crime
on the victim, the Act requires the preparation of a "Victim Impact Statement" in every federal
criminal case. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(2).
3. S. REP. No. 532, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 30, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2536 [hereinafter Senate Report].
4. 18 U.S.C. § 3580(e) (1982) (renumbered 18 U.S.C. § 3664(e) (1987) (effective Nov. 1,
1987)). See Senate Report, supra note 3, at 32, reprintedin 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws at 2538.
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The conviction of a defendant for an offense involving the
Act giving rise to restitution under this section shall estop
the defendant from denying the essential allegations of that
offense in any subsequent civil proceeding. An order of restitution hereunder will not bar any subsequent civil remedy
or recovery, but the amount of such restitution shall be set
off against any subsequent independent civil recovery.6
This article will discuss the legislative history of each statute, and
focus on how the statutory provisions give collateral estoppel effect
to the use of criminal convictions in subsequent civil proceedings. The
discussion will next turn to the application and procedural use of the
statutes, and proceed with a review of the law relating to the intentional act exclusion clause contained in most insurance policies. This
article will end with a brief discussion of the pertinent provisions of
Florida's Civil Remedies For Criminal Practices Act, which contains
limited collateral estoppel provisions.
II.

HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

A.

Legislative History

The VWPA was spawned out of a national awareness of and concern
for the rights and needs of crime victims. 6 When he declared the last

week in April, 1982, to be Crime Victims Week, President Reagan
stated that the "plight of innocent citizens, victims of lawlessness,
deserves immediate national attention. '' 7 So immediate was the national attention that the VWPA was introduced in Congress on April
22, 1982,8 and signed into law by the President on October 12, 1982. 9
Three basic policy considerations support the use of restitution as
a criminal sanction under the VWPA. First, the VWPA requires restitution as a means of reparation to victims rather than rehabilitation
to offenders.10 Second, restitution should be a priority of the criminal
FLA. STAT. § 775.089(8) (1984).
6. See Senate Report, supra note 3, at 9-10, reprintedin 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 2515-16.

5.

7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248, 1258 (1982).

10. The Senate Judiciary Committee stated: "Whatever else the sanctioning power of society
does to punish its wrongdoers, it should also insure that the wrongdoer is required to the degree
possible to restore the victim to his or her prior state of well-being." See Senate Report, supra
note 3, at 30, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2536. The Committee

further stated, "New methods at constructive, victim oriented, sentencing practices can insure
. . . that the prosecutorial, judicial and probation authorities know, and are encouraged to
respond to, the victim's monetary damages." Id. at 31, reprintedin 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws at 2537.
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justice system, and should come before the government's interest in
punishing or rehabilitating the criminal.,' Third, the VWPA is designed
to "provide a model for State and local governments."' 2 In summary,
the VWPA's primary interest is to strengthen existing legal protections for victims and to develop additional legislative proposals towards
that end.'13
One of the new provisions designed to fulfill the policies and goals
of the V'WPA is contained in 18 U.S.C. § 3580(e). 14 This section provides "the conviction of an offense that would properly give rise to
restitution shall estop that defendant from denying the essential allegations of the criminal offense in any subsequent civil proceeding
brought by the victim.' 5 The intent of this statute is to "obviate a
victim's need to establish a defendant's 6 liability in a civil suit for
punitive and/or compensatory damages.'
The Florida legislature, apparently using the VWPA as its model,
enacted its Victim and Witness Protection Act, effective October 1,
1984.17 The Florida legislature noted that 'the historic unresponsiveness of the criminal justice system to the real needs of victims and
witnesses has not yet been fully corrected" 18 and "while state law
provides the option of financial restitution to victims by defendants,
most victims are never fully or even partially compensated by defendants for their injuries and other losses." 9 In response to Florida's
concern for the plight of crime victims, the legislature also enacted
Florida Statutes section 775.089(8). 20 This section provides that "a
conviction for any offense involving restitution would estop the defendant from denying [the] essential allegations of that offense in any
'21
subsequent civil proceeding.
11.

This priority is reflected in the Act's requirement that the sentencing court state reasons

on the record for not ordering restitution or ordering only partial restitution. 18 U.S.C. §
3579(a)(2) (1982).
12. See Senate Report, supra note 3, at 10, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws at 2516.
13. See Senate Report, supra note 3, at 9-10, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 2515-16.
14. 18 U.S.C. § 3580(e) (1982) (renumbered 18 U.S.C. § 3664(e) (1987) (effective Nov. 1,

1987)).
15.

See Senate Report, supranote 3, at 32, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.

NEws at 2538.
16.
17.

Id.
Victim and Witness Protection Act, ch. 363, 1984 Fla. Laws 2143 [hereinafter Florida

VWPA].
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at 2144.
Id.
FLA. STAT. § 775.089(8) (1984).
Fla. S. Staff Analysis and Economic Impact Statement, Apr. 11, 1984, at 2.
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This new statute constitutes a substantial change in Florida law2
that will have a major impact on the victim's ability to recover damages
against convicted criminal defendants without the long delays usually
associated with such civil proceedings.2 The federal statute, on the
other hand, is a codification of existing federal law.-

22. Trucking Employees of N. Jersey Welfare Fund, Inc. v. Romano, 450 So. 2d 843 (Fla.
1984); Boshnack v. World Wide Rent A-Car, Inc., 195 So. 2d 216 (Fla. 1967); Mosley v. Ewing,
79 So. 2d 776 (Fla. 1955); Stevens v. Duke, 42 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 1949); Nunez v. Gonzalez, 456
So. 2d 1336 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1984); Nell v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 675,
427 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1983).
In'Nell, the president of a union was covered by a labor organization security bond. Nell.
427 So. 2d at 799. He was convicted of embezzling the union's funds in federal court, and the
union subsequently sued the bonding company to recover the amount stolen from the union
coffers. Id. The bonding company filed a third party complaint against the convicted president
for indemnity. Id. The bonding company paid the claim to the union and then moved for summary
judgment against the convicted president, which was granted. Id. The court reversed that
judgment and held that the lower court improperly gave collateral estoppel effect to the conviction. Id. at 800. The court recognized that affirmance would be proper if judgment had been
rendered by a federal court, because federal courts apply collateral estoppel to criminal convictions in subsequent civil proceedings. Id. at 799. The court stated that "issues common to civil
and criminal proceedings, directly determined in the prior criminal proceeding, would have to
be tried anew in the civil action." Id. at 800.
In Romano, the Florida Supreme Court reaffirmed its prior decisions that prohibit the
offensive use of criminal convictions in subsequent civil proceedings. 450 So. 2d at 846. The
court stated that collateral estoppel may be asserted only when the identical issue has been
litigated between the same parties or their privies. Id. at 845. The court reasoned that the trial
court's determination of whether the facts are indeed identical, and whether the defendant had
a fair opportunity and reasonable inducement to defend the criminal charge, would present
fertile grounds for appeal. Id. Thus any reduction of judicial labor at the trial level would be
offset by an increase of work at the appellate level. Id. at 845-46. The court also reasoned that
the same evidence relevant to the criminal charge might have to be introduced to prove other
elements of liability such as comparative negligence or damages. Id. at 846. For a further
discussion of Romano, see infra notes 67-72 and accompanying text. By enacting FLA. STAT.
§ 775.089(8) (1984), the legislature believed that protecting crime victims' rights far outweighs
any compromise of judicial economy that might occur by applying the collateral estoppel provisions of the statute. Additionally, the archaic rule of mutuality of parties has long since lost its
luster.
23. See, e.g., W. Clay Jackson Enters., Inc. v. Greyhound Leasing & Fin. Corp., 467 F.
Supp. 801, 802 (D.P.R. 1979) (the court stated 'It has become crystal clear that defendants and
their counsel, in an apparent overpowering show of economic strength, have, by their subversion
of the processes of the law, particularly their gross abuse of the mechanisms of discovery,
attempted to delay plaintiffs right to a fair day in court"). In addition to extensive and frivolous
discovery proceedings, civil defendants can delay by using meritorious as well as frivolous
defenses. The consistent filing of motions delay the proceedings and increase the plaintiffs
expenses when responding.
24. See United States v. Palma, 760 F.2d 475 (3d Cir. 1985); United States v. Satterfield,
743 F.2d 827 (11th Cir. 1984). In Palma, the court was primarily concerned with deciding the
constitutionality of the VWPA. 760 F.2d at 475. One specific issue the court addressed was
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Constitutionality of the Statutes

The constitutionality of the federal VWPA restitution provisions
was first tested in United States v. Welden.25 In Welden, the defendants were convicted of kidnapping.2 Their criminal conduct resulted
in the death of one victim, sexual abuse and possible permanent
psychological damage to another victim, and damage to an automobile
belonging to a third victim.2 The defendants claimed the VWPA restitution provisions were unconstitutional and that they could not be
ordered under the Act to pay restitution to their victims.2 The District
Court agreed and refused to order restitution.2 One of the constitutional challenges addressed by the courts was that the restitution

whether the collateral estoppel provisions of VWPA violated the defendant's right to a jury
trial as guaranteed by the seventh amendment. Id. at 479. In holding that the VWPA did not
violate the defendant's constitutional right to trial by jury, the court stated that "the VWPA
merely codifies the general rule that a criminal conviction may be accorded collateral estoppel
effect as to some issues raised in a subsequent civil suit." Id.
The Satterfield court had decided this same constitutional issue prior to Palma and also
found that the VWPA did not violate the seventh amendment. 743 F.2d at 837. In so ruling,
the court also recognized that "[slubsection 3580(e) does no more than codify the rule in this
and other circuits that a criminal conviction may be used as conclusive proof of some issues in
a subsequent civil litigation." Id. at 838. For examples of federal decisions applying traditional
rules of collateral estoppel in giving collateral estoppel effect to criminal convictions in subsequent
civil proceedings, see Appley v. West, 832 F.2d 1021 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Wight,
819 F.2d 485 (4th Cir. 1987); Gelb v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 798 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1986); Raiford
v. Abney, 695 F.2d 521 (11th Cir. 1983); Wolfson v. Baker, 623 F.2d 1074 (5th Cir. 1980);
United States v. Podell, 572 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1978); Bressan Export-Import Co. v. Conlew, 346
F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Penn. 1972).
25. 568 F. Supp. 516 (N.D. Ala. 1983), rev'd sub nom. United States v. Satterfield, 743
F.2d 827 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1117 (1985).
26. 568 F. Supp. at 517.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 536.
30. The court also considered whether the VWPA violated the eighth amendment, which
prohibits excessive fines and cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 532. Although the court
expressed doubts whether the Act complies with the eighth amendment, the court found that
it was possible to construe the VWPA so as to pass muster under the eighth amendment by
indulging the presumption of constitutionality. Therefore, the court held that the Act did not
violate the eighth amendment. Id. at 533.
The court also considered whether the VWPA violates the due process and equal protection
clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. Id. at 534-35. The court expressed concern that
ascertainable standards were lacking that courts could utilize in evenly and fairly applying the
Act. The court also stated that a restitution order under the VWPA could not be collectible as
a civil judgment without the due process procedural safeguard of a full evidentiary hearing. Id.
Therefore, the court held that the VWPA was unconstitutional because it violated the fifth and
fourteenth amendments. Id.
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provisions of the VWPA violated the seventh amendment, which provides that "in suits at common law, where the value in controversy
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right to trial by jury shall be preserved." 31 The court stated the VWPA turns a restitution order into
a civil judgment, and gives the restitution hearing res judicata effect.3
Therefore, the court reasoned that a restitution hearing is a suit at
common law within the meaning of the seventh amendment. 3 Because
the defendants were not entitled to a jury trial concerning the amount
of restitution to be awarded under the VWPA, the court held the Act
to be unconstitutional as violating the seventh amendment.4
In United States v. Satterfield, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the Welden decision.3 The court specifically addressed
the issue of whether the VWPA provisions give collateral estoppel
effect to all of the facts underlying a restitution order, thus depriving
the defendants of their constitutional right to a jury trial under the
seventh amendment. 3 The Court of Appeals held the collateral estoppel provisions of the VWPA neither convert the restitution hearing
into a civil proceeding nor deny the defendants their right to a jury
trial3 7 The court found that:
The section merely states that a "conviction" of a defendant
for an offense giving rise to a restitution order shall estop
the defendant from denying "the essential allegations of that
offense" in a subsequent civil proceeding. 18 U.S.C. Section
3580(e) (emphasis added). The defendant is barred from challenging in a later proceeding only those facts underlying the
criminal offense that were necessarily decided by the jury's
verdict. The Act's collateral estoppel provision would not
apply to those facts supporting the restitution order - e.g.,
the extent and nature of the victim's injury or the value of
damaged property - that were not part of the essential
allegations underlying the criminal conviction.3
The court also found that the VWPA did not violate the due process
and equal protection clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments.9

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

U.S. CONST. amend.

VII.

568 F. Supp. at 534.
Id.
Id.
743 F.2d 827 (11th Cir. 1984).
Id. at 837.
Id. at 838.
Id.
Id. at 839-43.
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In so ruling, the court reversed that part of the Welden decision that
found the VWPA unconstitutional, and remanded the case back to the
trial court to award restitution to the victim in accordance with the
Act. 40

Other courts that have decided these constitutional issues are in
accord with the decision and reasoning in Satterfield.41 To date, however, the Florida statute has not been constitutionally challenged.
Because the substantive provisions of the federal statute are identical
with those of the Florida statute, it is likely that the Florida statute
will survive intact.
III.

COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL

Both Congress2 in the legislative history of the VWPA and the
federal courts43 used the term "res judicata" when discussing the
effect the statute had in preventing a convicted criminal from denying
the essential allegations of the criminal offense in a subsequent civil
suit. However, both the federal and Florida statutes are intended to
give collateral estoppel effect to criminal convictions when used to
establish the facts underlying the essential elements of the crime in
a subsequent civil suit for damages. This is important to note because
there is a difference between the two legal theories and the effect
each has on the subsequent proceedings. 4 Res judicata means a final

40. Id. at 850-51.
41. United States v. Palma, 760 F.2d 475 (3d Cir. 1985); United States v. Brown, 744 F.2d
905 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Ciambrone, 602 F. Supp. 563 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); United
States v. Brown, 587 F. Supp. 1005 (E.D. Pa. 1984). See also Note, The Unconstitutionality
of the Victim and Witness ProtectionAct Under the Seventh Amendment, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
1590 (1984); Note, Where Offenders Pay For Their Crimes - Victim Restitution and Its Constitutionality, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 685 (1984); Note, The Right to a Jury Trial to Determine
Restitution Under the Victim and Witness ProtectionAct of 1982, 63 TEx. L. REv. 671 (1984);
Recent Decisions, The Constitutionalityof the Victim and Witness ProtectionAct of 1982, 35
ALA. L. REV. 529 (1984).

42. See Senate Report, supra note 3, at 31, reprintedin 1982 U.S.

CODE CONG. & ADMIN.

NEWS at 2537.

43. United States v. Brown, 744 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Ciambrone, 602
F. Supp. 563 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); United States v. Welden, 568 F. Supp. 516 (N.D. Ala. 1983),
rev'd sub nom. United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827 (11th Cir. 1984).
44. The Florida courts have long recognized the distinction between res judicata and collateral estoppel, which is also referred to as estoppel by judgment. Field v. Field, 91 So. 2d 640
(Fla. 1956); Riehl v. Riehl, 60 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 1952); Stadler v. Cherry Hill Developers, Inc.,
150 So. 2d 468 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1963). See also Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980); Johnson
v. United States, 576 F.2d 606 (5th Cir. 1978); Trucking Employees of N. Jersey Welfare Fund,
Inc. v. Romano, 450 So. 2d 843 (Fla. 1984); Gordon v. Gordon, 59 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1952).
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judgment bars a subsequent suit between the same parties based on
the same cause of action, and is conclusive as to all matters germane
thereto that were or could have been raised.

5

Collateral estoppel, on

the other hand, applies where the two causes of action are different.
Then, the judgment in the first suit only estops the parties from
litigating in the second suit, issues that are common to both causes
of action and which were actually decided or adjudicated in the prior
litigation.4
The term res judicata has traditionally encompassed both of these
47
doctrines, and courts have tended to use them interchangeably.
Courts and Congress apparently used the term res judicata in this
broad sense. This does not affect the analysis that the statutes give
collateral estoppel effect to the use of criminal convictions in subsequent civil suits for damages.4
The doctrine of collateral estoppel has been used by the courts to
prevent identical parties from re-litigating issues previously decided
between them. 49 Historically, collateral estoppel had three essential
elements: (1) the parties and issues must be identical; (2) the particular
matter must be fully litigated and determined; and, (3) the litigation
must result in a final decision of a court of competent jurisdiction 0

Many courts and legal scholars now prefer to use the term 'ssue preclusion" rather than
"collateral estoppel" and the term "claim preclusion" rather than "res judicata." Claim preclusion
occurs when an action has been brought on a claim and a final judgment has been rendered.
The plaintiff is thereafter precluded from bringing another action on the same claim. Issue
preclusion arises when an issue has been litigated and a judgment on that issue has been entered.
The losing party in this action is thereafter precluded from litigating that issue in subsequent
proceedings. Many believe this new terminology is more accurate and more precise. For examples
of recent federal decisions utilizing this modern terminology, see Glantz v. United States, 837
F.2d 23 (1st Cir. 1988); Appley v. West, 832 F.2d 1021 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Wight,
819 F.2d 485 (4th Cir. 1987); Gilldorn Sav. Ass'n v. Commerce Sav. Ass'n, 804 F.2d 390 (7th
Cir. 1986).
45. See supra note 44 and accompanying text; see also Baum v. Pines Realty, Inc., 164
So. 2d 517 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1964).
46. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text; see also Parklane Hosiery v. Shore, 439
U.S. 322 (1979).
47. Johnson v. United States, 576 F.2d 606 (5th Cir. 1978); Miami Beach v. Prevatt, 97
So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1957); In re Haskin Estate, 63 So. 2d 320 (Fla. 1953); Gordon v. Gordon, 59
So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1952); McGregor v. Provident Trust Co., 119 Fla. 718, 162 So. 323 (1935).
48. At least two courts recognize that the federal statute is premised on the doctrine of
collateral estoppel. See United States v. Palma, 760 F.2d 475 (3d Cir. 1985); United States v.
Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827 (11th Cir. 1984).
49. Tomlinson v. Lefkowitz, 334 F.2d 262 (5th Cir. 1964); Hyman v. Regenstein, 258 F.2d
502 (5th Cir. 1958); Gordon v. Gordon, 59 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1952).
50. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. See also Wehling v. Columbia Broadcasting
Sys., 721 F.2d 506 (5th Cir. 1983); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Shevin, 354 So. 2d 372 (Fla. 1977);
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The courts that refuse to apply the collateral estoppel doctrine to
the use of prior criminal convictions in subsequent civil suits have set
forth unconvincing reasons for their refusal.5 1 The most important

reason articulated by courts is the dissimilarity between civil and
criminal proceedings.52 For example, different rules of evidence apply
to the elements of proof, degrees of proof, weight of the evidence,
and the competency of witnesses. Some courts have also held that
a prior judgment of conviction is inadmissible as hearsay.M Finally,
the mutuality rule, which requires that the parties in the present

lawsuit be identical with parties in the prior suit before the doctrine
of collateral estoppel can be invoked, has proved the most formidable

obstacle to giving collateral estoppel effect to criminal convictions in
subsequent civil proceedings.s
Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v. Cox, 338 So. 2d 190 (Fla. 1976); Gray v. Gray, 91 Fla. 103, 107
So. 261 (1926).
The more recent federal decisions modify the traditional requirements of collateral estoppel
doctrine. See, e.g., Appley v. West, 832 F.2d 1021 (7th Cir. 1987); Kunzelman v. Thompson,
799 F.2d 1172 (7th Cir. 1985). The federal courts have long abandoned the mutuality rule and
now require that the party against whom collateral estoppel is applied must have been a party
in the prior proceeding. 799 F.2d at 1176. The Kunzelman court sets forth the four requisites
of the collateral estoppel doctrine as applied by recent federal decisions, as follows:
In general, collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of issues in a subsequent proceeding when: (1) the party against whom the doctrine is asserted was a party to
the earlier proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated and decided on the merits;
(3) the resolution of the particular issue was necessary to the result; and (4) the
issues are identical. Id.
The intent behind application of these requirements of the collateral estoppel doctrine furthers
the policy that once a party has had a fair opportunity to litigate an issue, that party should
not have a second chance. See Appley, 832 F.2d at 1025.
51. Chantangco v. Abaroa, 218 U.S. 476 (1910); Brown v. Moyle, 133 Colo. 29, 290 P.2d
1105 (1955); Romano v. Trucking Employees of N. Jersey Welfare Fund, Inc., 427 So. 2d 802
(Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1983); Nell v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local #675, 427 So.
2d 798 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1983); Seidman v. Seidman, 53 R.I. 96, 164 A. 194 (1933).
52. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331 n.15 (1979); Nell, 427 So. 2d at 800
n.3; Haynes v. Rollins, 434 P.2d 234, 237 (Okla. 1967).
53. Nell, 427 So. 2d at 800 n.3.
54. See, e.g., Travelers Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 281 Minn. 547, 163 N.W.2d 289 (1968). Some
commentators suggest that findings made in a criminal proceeding constitute inadmissible hearsay
when offered in a subsequent civil suit. See, e.g., Hinton, Judgment of Conviction - Effect in
a Civil Case as Res Judicata or as Evidence, 27 ILL. L. REV. 195 (1932); Note, Effect of Prior
Criminal Conviction in Subsequent Civil Action, 2 SYRACUSE L. REv. 106 (1950).
55. See, e.g., Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111 (1912);
Grantham v. McGraw-Edison Co., 444 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1971); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Shevin, 354
So. 2d 372 (Fla. 1977); Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v. Cox, 338 So. 2d 190 (Fla. 1976); Romano
v. Trucking Employees of N. Jersey Welfare Fund, Inc., 427 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1983);
Nell v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local #675, 427 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 4th D.C.A.

1983).
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A landmark decision that began the decline of the doctrine of mutuality of parties is
Bernhard v. Bank of America, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942). In Bernhard, the plaintiff
had attempted to object to an accounting that the executor of an estate fied. Id. at 809, 122
P.2d at 893. The plaintiff claimed the executor had wrongfully withdrawn the funds from the
decedent's bank account. Id. The court, in the probate proceedings, denied the plaintiffs claim
and held that the funds constituted a gift to the executor. Id. at 809, 810, 122 P.2d at 893, 894.
The plaintiff then instituted a civil suit against the person she had previously claimed wrongfully
withdrew the decedent's funds. Id. at 810, 122 P.2d at 893. The defendant asserted res judicata
as an affirmative defense alleging this particular issue had previously been decided by the
probate court. Id. at 810, 122 P.2d at 893, 894. The plaintiff contended that res judicata did
not apply because no mutuality of parties existed in the present suit. Id. The court specifically
rejected the mutuality rule by stating 'there is no compelling reason ...for requiring that the
party asserting the plea of res judicata must have been a party or in privity with a party, to
the earlier litigation." Id. 812, 122 P.2d at 894. Thereafter, a growing number of courts followed
the Bernhard court's lead and abandoned the doctrine of mutuality of parties, either in whole
or in part. See Cramer v. General Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 582 F.2d 259, 267 (3d Cir. 1978) (the
court stated that "mutuality of estoppel is no longer required for the principle of collateral
estoppel to apply," where the prior judgment 's being invoked defensively'); Humphreys v.
Tann, 487 F.2d 666, 669 (6th Cir. 1973) (the court found it difficult to comprehend "why a party
who was not bound by a previous action should be precluded from asserting it as res judicata
against a party who was bound by it"); Zdanok v. Gliddon Co., 327 F. 2d 944 (2d Cir. 1964)
(the court's ruling on liability and the contract construction in a suit by one group of employees
would preclude the corporation from contesting liability on those same issues in a suit by a
different group of employees); Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419, 421 (3d Cir. 1950)
(the court rejected the mutuality rule reasoning that "the achievement of substantial justice
rather than symmetry is the measure of the fairness of the rules of res judicata"); Pat Perusse
Realty Co. v. Lingo, 249 Md. 33, 35, 238 A.2d 100, 102 (1968) ('The wall of mutuality never
having been solid, the likely has happened and courts have gradually widened the breaches.');
Home Owners Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Northwestern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 354 Mass.
448, 455, 238 N.E.2d 55, 59 (1968) ("one not a party to the first action may use a judgment in
that action defensively against a party who was a plaintiff in the first action on the issues which
the judgment decided'); Sanderson v. Balfour, 109 N.H. 213, 215, 247 A.2d 185, 187 (1968) (the
court recognized that the mutuality doctrine "owed more for its acceptance to the gaming table
than reason'); B.R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 147, 225 N.E.2d 195, 198, 278 N.Y.S.2d
596, 601 (1967) (the court determined that the mutuality doctrine was a "dead letter").
The assault on the mutuality doctrine reached its peak with two Supreme Court decisions
in the 1970s. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979); Blonder-Tongue Lab.,
Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971). In Blonder Tongue, the court held that
a patentee was estopped to assert the validity of a patent in a patent infringement suit when
the patent had previously been declared invalid in a prior suit in a federal court against a
different defendant. 402 U.S. at 349-50. The court limited its ruling to the defensive use of
collateral estoppel and only to patent infringement suits where the estopped party had a full
and fair opportunity, procedurally, substantively, and evidentially to litigate the validity of his
patent in a prior suit. Id. In rejecting the mutuality rule in patent infringement cases, the court
held that a rigid application of the doctrine would be unacceptable when it recognized that:
Permitting repeated litigation of the same issue as long as the supply of unrelated
defendants holds out reflects either the aura of the gaming table or "a lack of
discipline and of disinterestedness on the part of the lower courts, hardly a worthy
or wise basis for fashioning rules of procedure."
Id. at 329 (quoting Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Co., 342 U.S. 180, 185 (1952)).
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However, the dissimilarity between civil and criminal proceedings
and the applicable rules of evidence should favor giving collateral
estoppel effect to prior criminal convictions in subsequent civil suits.
A criminal defendant is accorded procedural and evidentiary

safeguards far greater than those provided to civil litigants. These
safeguards render a criminal conviction a sufficiently reliable determination of the relevant facts in issue. 6 This same reason also admits
such convictions as an exception to the hearsay rule.57 For example,
the Federal Rules of Evidence admit judgments of conviction for serious crimes as an exception to the hearsay rule.
Courts finally began giving collateral estoppel effect to criminal
convictions in subsequent civil suits when adherence to the mutuality
rule began to decline. However, this gradual movement toward giving
collateral estoppel effect to criminal convictions grew more from policy
concerns than from development of legal theory. Courts used the doctrine of collateral estoppel to prevent convicted criminals from benefitting from their crimes. In the leading case of Eagle, Star & British
Dominions Insurance Co. v. Heller,59 the Virginia Supreme Court
prevented a convicted arsonist from recovering under a fire insurance
policy insuring the premises he was convicted of burning.6 The courts
In Parklane Hosiery, the court continued its assault on the mutuality doctrine by ruling
that collateral estoppel may be applied offensively by a plaintiff who was not a party to the
prior litigation. 439 U.S. at 332-33. This may be used only under specifically defined circumstances. Id. The court held that a party may use non-mutual collateral estoppel offensively
when he was procedurally barred from joining in the prior action, and when use of the doctrine
would not be unfair to the other party. Id. at 331.
Although some states, like Florida, refuse to part with the mutuality doctrine, its demise
is likely to continue; while mutuality might not be a dead letter yet, it is mortally wounded.
56. United States v. Thomas, 709 F.2d 968 (5th Cir. 1983); Raiford v. Abney, 695 F.2d
521 (11th Cir. 1983); Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 601, 375 P.2d 439,
25 Cal. Rptr. 559 (1962).
57. See United States v. Thomas, 709 F.2d 968 (5th Cir. 1983); State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co. v. Worthington, 405 F.2d 683 (8th Cir. 1968).
58. FED. R. EVID. 803(22). Rule 803(22) provides as an exception to the hearsay rule:
Evidence of a final judgment, entered after a trial or upon a plea of guilty (but
not upon a plea of nolo contendere), adjudicating a person guilty of a crime punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year, to prove any fact essential
to sustain the judgment, but not including, when offered by the Government in a
criminal prosecution for purposes other than impeachment, judgments against persons other than the accused. The pendency of an appeal may be shown but does
not affect admissibility.
Id.
59. 149 Va. 82, 140 S.E. 314 (1927).
60. Id. See e.g., Austin v. United States, 125 F.2d 816 (7th Cir. 1942) (the court held that
a murder conviction was conclusive of plaintiffs guilt and thereby prevented his recovery as
beneficiary of his victim's life insurance policy); Rosenberger v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins.
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subsequently expanded the use of collateral estoppel and allowed the
offensive use of prior convictions to permit government agencies and
private litigants to recover the fruits of the crime. 61 However, courts
were not going to restrict the use of offensive collateral estoppel to
allow recovery only of the fruits of a crime. Holding that mutuality
of the parties was no longer a prerequisite to apply collateral estoppel,
courts began to allow private litigants, 62 as well as government agencies,63 to use criminal convictions in subsequent civil suits to recover
damages and other forms of relief. With the erosion of the mutuality
requirement, the use of prior criminal convictions in subsequent civil
suits pursuant to the collateral estoppel doctrine ceased being an exception and has become well established in federalc, and several state
courts.c5
Co., 182 F. Supp. 633 (D. Kan. 1960) (the court held that a person convicted of murder was
precluded from benefiting from his act pursuant to a statute that provided no person convicted
of murder shall receive or inherit anything from the decedent's will or estate); Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co. v. McDavid, 39 F. Supp. 228 (E.D. Mich. 1941); Sovereign Camp W.O.W. v.
Gunn, 227 Ala. 400, 150 So. 491 (1933); Wolf v. Employers Fire Ins. Co., 282 Ky. 824, 140
S.W.2d 640 (1940) (the court admitted an arson conviction into evidence in a subsequent civil
suit brought by an arsonist seeking to recover fire insurance proceeds); In re Kravitz's Estate,
418 Pa. 319, 211 A.2d 443 (1985).
61. See, e.g., Hardin v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 384 F.2d 718 (5th Cir. 1967); United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Moore, 306 F. Supp. 1088 (N.D. Miss. 1969); Hurtt v. Stirone,
416 Pa. 493, 206 A.2d 624 (1965); Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n v. United States Fidelity &
Guar. Co., 412 Pa. 222, 194 A.2d 423 (1963).
Collateral estoppel can be applied both offensively and defensively. The Court in Parklane
Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1972), noted the differences between offensive and defensive
use of collateral estoppel. The Parklane Court held that the offensive use of collateral estoppel
usually involves a plaintiff who 'is seeking to estop a defendant from relitigating the issues
which the defendant previously litigated and lost against another plaintiff." Id. at 329. Defensive
collateral estoppel occurs when a plaintiff is "estopped from asserting a claim that the plaintiff
had previously litigated and lost against another defendant." Id. The Court noted that 'in both
the offensive and defensive use situations, the party against whom estoppel is asserted has
litigated and lost in an earlier action." Id. The collateral estoppel provisions of the VWPA are
intended to be used offensively by the crime victim to recover for the personal or property
injuries or damages sustained from the criminal offense.
62. See, e.g., Ross v. Lawson, 395 A.2d 54 (D.C. Ct. App. 1978); Newman v. Larsen, 225
Cal. App. 2d 22, 36 Cal. Rptr. 883 (1964); Read v. Sacco, 49 A.D. 471, 375 N.Y.S.2d 371 (1975);
Roshak v. Leathers, 277 Or. 207, 560 P.2d 275 (1977).
63. See, e.g., Chisholm v. Defense Logistics Agency, 656 F.2d 42 (3d Cir. 1981); SEC v.
Dimensional Entertainment Corp., 493 F. Supp. 1270 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); SEC v. Everest Management Corp., 466 F. Supp. 167 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
64. See, e.g., Glantz v. United States, 837 F.2d 23 (1st Cir. 1988); Appley v. West, 832
F.2d 1021 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Wight, 819 F.2d 485 (4th Cir. 1987); Raiford v.
Abney, 695 F.2d 521 (11th Cir. 1983); Wolfson v. Baker, 623 F.2d 1074 (5th Cir. 1980); Breeland
v. Security Ins. Co. of New Haven, 421 F.2d 918, 922 (5th Cir. 1969) (the court stated that
"the number of jurisdictions holding that a criminal conviction precludes litigation of the same
issue in a civil suit is ever increasing'.
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Unfortunately, Florida courts have stubbornly adhered to the
mutuality rule in their consistent refusal to give collateral estoppel
effect to criminal convictions in subsequent civil suits.6 For example,

The general rule is that an acquittal concludes no issues as to civil liability in favor of the
acquitted defendant and the courts have refused to apply collateral estoppel to acquittals in
subsequent civil proceedings. The underlying theory is that the prosecution's offered proof in
a criminal case, although insufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and thus support
a conviction, may be sufficient to support a judgment of civil liability based on proof by a
preponderance of the evidence or by clear and convincing evidence. See, e.g., United States v.
National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485 (1950); Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391
(1938); United States v. Burkhart, 501 F.2d 993 (6th Cir. 1974); Polcover v. Secretary of
Treasury, 477 F.2d 1223 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Stall v. Dubose, 11 So. 2d 477 (Fla. 1943). However,
one exception exists where criminal responsibility is an element of the civil cause of action. See,
e.g., Hill v. Morris, 15 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 1956) (the court allowed a widow to introduce a judgment
acquitting her of murder so that she might place herself outside the purview of a statute that
prevented a person convicted of murder, from inheriting from the victim's estate).
65. See supra note 62. Only Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, New
Mexico, North Carolina, and North Dakota have recently followed the mutuality rule. Casad,
Intersystem Issue Preclusion and the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, 66 CORNELL L.
REV. 510 n.1 (1981).
66. See, e.g., Trucking Employees of N. Jersey Welfare Fund, Inc. v. Romano, 450 So. 2d
843 (Fla. 1984); Nunez v. Gonzalez, 456 So. 2d 1336 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1984); Nell v. International
Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 675, 427 So. 2d 798 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1983).
One District Court of Appeal attempted to persuade the Florida Supreme Court to change
its rigid stance toward the mutuality doctrine. In Romano, the Fourth District Court reversed
a summary judgment on the issue of liability in a civil case. 427 So. 2d at 803. The lower court
based its ruling solely upon a criminal conviction that arose from the same facts and circumstances. Id. at 802. The district court found the arguments persuasive for abandoning the
mutuality requirement and indicated it might do so if it were not for the Florida Supreme Court
decisions requiring application of the doctrine. Id. at 803. The court did, however, certify the
question to the Florida Supreme Court whether a party may use a criminal judgment offensively
in a civil suit to prevent the defendant from relitigating issues resolved against him in the
criminal proceeding. Id. The Florida Supreme Court answered in the negative in Romano, 450
So. 2d at 843.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal, however, is trying once again to convince the Florida
Supreme Court to abandon the mutuality doctrine. Ward v. Zeidwig, 521 So. 2d 215 (Fla. 4th
D.C.A. 1988). In Ward, the plaintiff brought a legal malpractice action against his former
attorney alleging ineffective assistance of counsel in defending the federal charges of conspiracy
to import and distribute marijuana. Id. at 216. The plaintiff sought to have that conviction
overturned due to ineffective assistance of counsel by the defendant who represented plaintiff
in the criminal proceedings. The federal court denied the plaintiffs request to vacate his sentence
and entered an order containing findings of fact that directly relate to the issues of legal
malpractice raised in the current civil proceedings. Id. at 217-18. In the civil proceedings, the
defendant moved for summary judgment contending that the plaintiff was collaterally estopped
from relitigating the same issues resolved by the federal court. The trial court granted summary
judgment and the district court grudgingly reversed due to the Florida Supreme Court's line
of decisions upholding the mutuality doctrine. Id. at 219. The court expressed its preference
for abandonment of the mutuality requirement by stating:
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in Trucking Employees of North Jersey Welfare Fund, Inc. v.
Romano,6 the Florida Supreme Court refused to give collateral estoppel effect to a federal conviction finding the defendants guilty of fraud
and misrepresentation.6 The plaintiffs, in a subsequent civil suit
against the same criminal defendants seeking damages for fraud and
breach of fiduciary duty, sought summary judgment on the issue of
liability. The plaintiffs argued that the prior criminal conviction conclusively established all of the plaintiffs alleged facts. 69 The court recognized that the federal courts have abandoned the mutuality rule and
now give collateral estoppel effect to criminal convictions in subsequent
civil proceedings.70 However, the court held that a litigant who was
not a party to a prior criminal proceeding could not use the resulting
criminal conviction offensively in a subsequent civil suit to prevent
the defendant from re-litigating issues resolved in the prior criminal
71
proceeding.
The Romano court also reaffirmed prior Florida decisions that
prohibit criminal convictions from being introduced into evidence in
subsequent civil proceedings.7 2 Florida courts have, however, carved
out an exception to this evidentiary rule. Courts will allow a criminal
conviction rendered pursuant to a plea of guilty to be introduced into
evidence in a subsequent civil proceeding. The reasoning is that such
a plea is admitted as a declaration against interest. However, giving

If this were a case of first impression we would adopt and echo the criticism
expressed by Justice Traynor in the following excerpt from his opinion for a unanimous California Supreme Court in Bernhard v. Bank of Am. Natl Trust & Sav.
Assoc., 19 Cal. 2d 807, 812, 122 P.2d 892, 895 (1942): "No satisfactory rationalization
has been advanced for the requirement of mutuality. Just why a party who was
not bound by a previous action should be precluded from asserting it as res judicata
against a party who was bound by it is difficult to comprehend."
Id.
Therefore, the court certified to the Florida Supreme Court the question of whether "identity
of parties or their privies continues to be a prerequisite in Florida to application of the doctrine
of collateral estoppel." Id. We will have to await the Florida Supreme Court's answer to this
question to see if the mutuality doctrine is still
alive and well in Florida.
67. 450 So. 2d at 843.
68. Id. at 846.
69. Id. at 844.
70. Id. at 845.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 845. See, e.g., Boshnack v. World Wide Rent-A Car, Inc., 195 So. 2d 216 (Fla.
1967); Mosley v. Ewing, 79 So. 2d 776 (Fla. 1955); Stevens v. Duke, 42 So. 2d 361 (Fla.1949).
73. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. See also Hatfield v. York, 354 So. 2d 426
(Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1978) (court noted that in civil actions where one of the issues is guilt of a
person convicted of a criminal offense, evidence of that person's guilty plea to the criminal
offense is properly admitted).
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collateral estoppel effect to a prior criminal conviction is a more potent
weapon for the plaintiff in a civil suit than simply admitting the criminal
judgment into evidence. Collateral estoppel prevents the defendant
from denying the facts established in the prior criminal proceeding,

and thus conclusively establishes those facts before the civil trial commences. On the other hand, allowing the prior criminal conviction to
be admitted into evidence is of much less consequence. In considering
liability, the finder of fact simply considers the conviction as a piece
of evidence along with other evidence presented by the plaintiff and

defendant.' 4
By enacting Florida Statutes section 775.089(8), 7r the legislature
did what the courts have long been reluctant to do. This statute gives
collateral estoppel effect to criminal convictions in subsequent civil
proceedings brought by the crime victim. Both the Florida and federal
statutes provide the victim with a powerful litigation tool that obviates
the victim's need to establish the convicted defendant's liability in a
subsequent civil action; thereby, substantially increasing the victim's
chances of prevailing. 76
74. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
75. FLA. STAT. § 775.089(8) (1984).
76. Applying the collateral estoppel provisions of the statute will affect civil proceedings
in other ways as well. Generally, the victim will institute the civil suit either while the criminal
proceedings are pending or after the criminal proceedings have concluded. If the criminal proceedings conclude with a conviction, then the victim should either initiate or proceed with the
civil proceedings. The victim will move for summary judgment as to the liability issues determined by the criminal conviction and proceed to trial on the remaining issues. However, if the
criminal proceedings have not concluded, the victim should either wait until they conclude before
instituting suit or hold the civil proceedings already filed in abeyance until that time. The
conviction will be an enormous asset to the victim, and the victim may also, by observing the
criminal proceedings, gather valuable information that may be useful to him in the civil suit.
The criminal defendant may also reap advantages from the victim's delay in proceeding with
the civil action. First, the criminal defendant could direct all of his resources and energy toward
defending the criminal charges rather than spreading his efforts and attention over the defense
of two legal proceedings at the same time. Second, the criminal defendant could avoid civil
discovery that may reveal damaging information to his prosecutor. Finally, the criminal proceedings may result in an acquittal, which is useless to the victim's civil proceedings against the
defendant.
The civil proceedings following a criminal conviction are substantially shortened because
collateral estoppel provisions of the statutes reduce the court's labor, and reduce the issues to
be resolved by the parties and the jury. The reductions allow the victim to direct all of his time
and resources to a limited number of issues, thereby increasing his chances for substantial
recovery. The civil proceedings will take less time to conclude, and many civil trials will be
eliminated altogether. Once the defendant knows statutory collateral estoppel may apply against
him, he will be much more inclined to reach an amicable settlement. Not only will the defendant
be stripped of his defenses to the liability issues, the facts surrounding the criminal conviction
could have an enormous impact on any jury regarding the issue of damages thereby enhancing
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IV.

APPLICATION AND PROCEDURAL USE OF THE STATUTES

The substantive provisions of the federal and Florida statutes are
identical. The plaintiff must initially establish three elements under
both statutes: (1) the plaintiff is a victim of the crime; 7 (2) the defendant in the criminal proceeding was convicted; and, (3) the conviction
is for an offense that involves the act giving rise to the restitution.

the possibilities of large damage awards. Therefore, the collateral estoppel provisions of the
statutes will greatly increase the victim's chances of recovering large awards and settlement.
Applying the statutes will also enormously affect the criminal proceedings. The criminal
defendant will more likely resolve the criminal proceedings by trial rather than by plea if he
realizes the civil consequences of a criminal conviction. The possibility always exists that a jury
may acquit him, while a plea would result in a conviction. Therefore, the number of cases
resolved by trial may increase while the incidence of plea negotiations may decline. This may
place additional burdens on the criminal justice system that must accommodate the accused's
rights to a trial by jury. However, the victim's benefits derived from applying statutory collateral
estoppel far outweigh any detriment to the criminal justice system.
The criminal proceedings may attract more participation from other interested non-parties
as well as the victim. The victim will be more inclined to actively participate in the criminal
proceedings to increase the chances for a conviction. The defendant's insurance company may
determine that it is in their best interest to financially assist the defendent in the criminal
proceedings to avoid the consequences of a large damage award resulting from statutory collateral
estoppel in the subsequent civil proceedings.
The prosecutor may feel added pressure to pursue criminal charges against defendants when
victims suffer severe injury or damage resulting from the defendant's conduct. Prosecutorial
discretion may be affected by the specter of severely injured or permanently damaged victims
who are deprived of a powerful litigation tool that can be used in a civil proceeding to help
them recover their losses. Thus, the prosecution of borderline cases may increase so the victim
has a greater chance of prevailing in subsequent civil proceedings.
77. Although both the federal and Florida statutes contain for the most part, identical
language, there is one difference that is noteworthy. The federal statute specifically states that
the collateral estoppel provisions will apply to civil proceedings "brought by the victim." 18
U.S.C. § 3580(e) (1982) (renumbered18 U.S.C. § 3664(e) (1987) (effective Nov. 1, 1987) (emphasis
added)). The Florida statute, however, does not contain this restrictive language. Some could
argue that the federal statute is limited to civil proceedings brought by the victim, while the
Florida statute applies to anyone bringing suit against the convicted criminal. However, such
an expansive reading of the Florida statute would depart from the legislature's intention of
protecting victims' rights and expanding "current statutory provisions dealing with victim...
restitution" as well as "providing comprehensive services to crime victims and witnesses." Fla.
S. Staff Analysis and Economic Impact Statement, Apr. 11, 1984, at 1. Furthermore, extending
the application of the collateral estoppel provisions of the VWPA too far could have a deleterious
effect on our judicial system and the orderly administration of justice, and also violate the right
to a full and fair hearing. As one author states in referring to the doctrine of collateral estoppel
"courts must be alert to the danger that its extension by merely logical processes of manipulation
may produce results which are abhorrent to the sense of justice and to orderly law administration." Carrie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the BernhardDoctrine, 9 STAN. L.
REV. 281, 289 (1957).
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Once the plaintiff meets these threshold requirements, the plaintiff
may invoke the statutes in any subsequent civil proceeding to estop
the convicted defendant from denying the essential allegations of the
criminal offense for which he was convicted.
A.

The Victim

The Florida VWPA defines the term "victim" to include "the aggrieved party, the aggrieved party's estate if the aggrieved party is
deceased, and the aggrieved party's next of kin if the aggrieved party
is deceased as a result of the offense." The federal VWPA, on the
other hand, does not contain a precise definition of the term "victim."
Human beings, their estates, and next of kin who suffer harm or
damage as a result of the criminal offense are victims who may utilize
the collateral estoppel provisions in any civil proceeding brought
against the criminal. However, it is uncertain whether non-human
victims and third parties who reimburse the actual victim fall within
the scope of the VWPA.
An examination of the legislative history of both the Florida and
federal VWPA indicates the legislatures' concern not only for the
physical, emotional, and financial problems of individuals affected by
crime, but with non-human victims and third parties who reimburse
the victim as well.7 In accord with the legislative history of the
VWPA, courts have given a broad interpretation of the term "victim"
to include persons, corporations, organizations, governments, and
third party reimbursers.
In United States v. Durham,8 the court was confronted with determining whether a bank and an insurance company are victims under
the federal VWPA. The defendant pled guilty to a charge of bank
robbery, and was ordered to pay restitution to the bank for its unrecovered losses.81 The court also ordered the defendant to pay restitution to the insurer of an automobile the defendant destroyed by arson
during the course of the robbery. 2 In addressing the issue of whether

78. FLA. STAT. § 775.089(1)(c) (1984).
79. See Senate Report, supra note 3, at 32-33, reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 2538-2539, which states that "subsection (b)(4) authorizes the court to order
restitution to third parties who have compensated the victim or the victim's family for expenses
or losses directly related to the crime." The report goes on to define third parties as "friends,
family members, or other individuals and organizations who have assisted the victim or the
victim's family as well as insurance companies and state compensation programs." Id.
80. 755 F.2d 511 (6th Cir. 1985).
81. Id. at 512.
82. Id. at 513.
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non-human entities such as banks and insurance companies are victims,
the court considered the legislative history of the VWPA and other
case law, and concluded that non-human entities may be entitled to
restitution under the Act. The court in United States v. Richard
likewise upheld an order requiring restitution to a bank; and the court,
in United States v. Florence,5upheld an order of restitution to both
a bank and an insurance company.
addressed the issue of
The court in United States v. Ruffen?
whether a government entity is a victim. The defendant was convicted
of conspiring to steal and convert United States funds by causing
improper payment of aid to families with dependent children benefitsY
The court ordered the defendant to pay restitution to the social ser5 The defendant argued that a govvices agency that lost the money.A
ernmental entity could not be a victim under the VWPA.s The court

rejected the argument by stating that "[w]hile the term 'victim' is not

The court summarized its ruling as follows:
Next, Durham claims that non-human entities are categorically excluded from the
definition of a "victim." Nothing in the statute or its legislative history supports
that claim. In fact, the Senate Report indicates that one purpose of the Act is to
remedy undesirable situations in which "insurance companies and the insurance
buying public are being asked to pay off the offender's debt." S. REP. No. 532,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1982), reprintedin 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 2515, 2537. Moreover, several courts have upheld restitution awards to
non-human entities under the Act. See United States v. Florence, 741 F.2d 1066
(8th Cir. 1984); United States v. Dudley, 739 F.2d 175 (4th Cir. 1984); United
States v. Richard, 738 F.2d 1120 (10th Cir. 1984). We conclude that a non human
entity may be a victim of the offense within the meaning of the Act.
Id. at 513-14.
84. 738 F.2d 1120 (10th Cir. 1984). The defendant robbed a bank and in the course of his
getaway, he hid the stolen money in another building. The police recovered most of the money
and the defendant was subsequently convicted. The court ordered the defendant to pay the
bank the difference between the amount the bank claimed was stolen and the amount recovered.
Id. at 1123.
85. 741 F.2d 1066 (8th Cir. 1984). This case also involved a defendant who was convicted
of robbing a bank. The court ordered the defendant to make restitution for the unrecovered
money. Part of the restitution was to be paid to the bank and the remainder to the bank's
insurance company that had reimbursed the bank for part of its loss. Id. at 1069.
86. 780 F.2d 1493 (9th Cir. 1986). The defendant also argued that the restitution order was
improper because the evidence clearly showed that he was indigent and had a family to support
after his release from prison. The court specifically stated that "[the VWPA does not prohibit
a sentencing court from imposing a restitutionary sentence upon a defendant who is indigent."
Id. at 1495.
87. Id. at 1494.
88. Id. at 1496.
89. Id.
83.
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defined in the VWPA, Section 3579(a)(1) of the VWPA permits restitution to 'any victim of the offense,' and the courts have granted restitution to nonhuman
entities such as the government and corporate institutions. ' '9o
Florida courts have also given the VWPA term "victim" a very
broad interpretation. In Warzybok v. State,91 the defendant pled no
contest to the charge of grand theft, and was ordered to pay restitution
to an insurance company.Y The defendant argued the insurance company was not a victim under the VWPA; and therefore, the court was
in error to order that he pay restitution to the insurer.9 3 The court
rejected that argument, and held the insurance company was a victim
reasoning that the insurance company was subrogated to the rights
of the crime victim.9" Several other state courts have held that insurers
are eligible to receive restitution.9 5 Some states have adopted statutory
provisions allowing restitution to be ordered to insurers who reimburse
victims.9
The court in Ballance v. Statew interpreted the 1981 version of
Florida Statutes section 775.089(1),9 which used the term "aggrieved
party" instead of "victim." The court upheld an order of restitution
to a corporation that expended funds to protect its vice president from
threatened bodily harm by the defendant.Y Florida courts have also
held that governmental entities are "aggrieved parties" under Florida
Statutes section 948.03,100 which provides that restitution can be or0
dered as a condition of probation. '

90. Id. at 1496. The court reasoned that the government "stands in the shoes' of the
taxpayers" and, therefore, 'there are human victims of this crime - taxpayers - who were
defrauded out of revenue which they had paid to the government." Id.
91. 505 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1987).
92. Id. at 508.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See, e.g., People v. Calhoun, 145 Cal. App. 3d 568, 193 Cal. Rptr. 394 (1983); People
v. Alexander, 182 Cal. App. 2d 281, 6 Cal. Rptr. 153 (1960); State v. Behrens, 204 Neb. 785,
285 N.W.2d 513 (1979); Flores v. State, 513 S.W.2d 66 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); see also State
v. Murray, 621 P.2d 334 (Haw. 1980) (state reimbursed victim and consequently was entitled
to receive restitution from the offender).
96. See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-37-I(d) (Supp. 1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-17-1(A)(1)
(1981); OR. REV. STAT. § 137.103(4) (1981).
97. 447 So. 2d 974 (1st D.C.A. 1984).
98. FLA. STAT. § 775.089(1) (1981).
99. 447 So. 2d at 975-76.
100. FLA. STAT. § 948.03 (1974).
101. See Milton v. State, 453 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1984); Cuba v. State, 362 So. 2d
29 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1978).
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This broad interpretation of "victim" utilized by the courts is designed to ensure that criminal defendants are not relieved of their
obligations to make restitution simply because of the victim's identity.
Courts are also concerned with the resulting inequities if those who
engage in criminal activity were not required to compensate corporate,
organizational, and governmental entities that suffer losses that will
ultimately be borne by the public or corporate shareholders. These
same policy considerations should also apply in providing non-human
entities with the use of the collateral estoppel provisions contained in
the VWPA.
B.

The Requirement of a Prior Conviction

Both the federal and Florida statutes require that the defendant
be convicted by the criminal court. This section will discuss convictions
based on guilty verdicts rendered after trial as well as convictions
based on guilty and nolo contendere pleas. This section will also
consider the issue of whether a withheld adjudication of guilt constitutes a conviction under the statutes.
1. Convictions Based on Verdicts of Guilty After Trial and Pleas of Guilty
and Nolo Contendere
Courts have generally had no problem giving collateral estoppel
effect to criminal convictions resulting from a guilty verdict rendered
after trial. 102 However, giving collateral estoppel effect to convictions
based on guilty pleas has raised controversy not only among the
courts, 1 3 but with legal scholars as well.1°4
Although some disagreement exists, the majority of courts will
give collateral estoppel effect to a conviction based on a guilty plea
reasoning that sufficient procedural safeguards are accorded to the

102. Wolfson v. Baker, 623 F.2d 1074 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Podell, 572 F.2d
31 (2d Cir. 1978).
103. Compare State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Worthington, 405 F.2d 683, 687 (8th Cir.
1968) (the court stated that "[t]he clear trend of authority is that evidence of a guilty plea is
[merely] admissible against a party in a subsequent civil proceeding but.., it may be explained
and is not conclusive' with United States v. Schneider, 139 F. Supp. 826, 829 (S.D.N.Y. 1956)
(the court stated that "where the prior conviction resulted from a plea of guilty there would

appear to be greater warrant for application of [collateral estoppel]'.
104. See Hazard, Revisiting the Second Restatement of Judgments: Issue Preclusion and
Related Problems, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 564 (1981); Vestal, The Restatement (Second) of
Judgments: A Modest Dissent, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 464 (1981); Note, Preclusive Effect Extended to Guilty Pleas in Subsequent Civil Litigation- Ideal Mutual Insurance Co. v. Winker,
68 IOWA L. REV. 1331 (1983).
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guilty pleader. 10 5 For example, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 11(f)1 requires that before the court may accept a guilty
plea, the court must satisfy itself that there is a factual basis for the
plea. Therefore, most courts find that a guilty plea is a sufficiently

reliable determination of the facts constituting the elements of the
offense to give collateral estoppel effect in a subsequent civil proceeding to a conviction based on a guilty plea. 1'
Furthermore, the collateral estoppel provisions of the VWPA require a "conviction" in order to trigger operation of the statutes.

Therefore, the issue is one of statutory interpretation and one must
determine whether a judgment based upon a guilty plea is a "conviction" under the VWPA. Courts have been confronted with this issue

when interpreting various statutes that require a "conviction" as a
prerequisite. Most courts conclude that the plea itself is a "conviction."

For example, in Boykin v. Alabama,'0 the United States Supreme
Court specifically stated "a plea of guilty is more than a confession
which admits that the accused did various acts; it is itself a conviction;
nothing remains but to give judgment and determine punishment."' °
In United States v. Woods," 0 the defendant was convicted under a

statute that provided that any person who has been convicted of a
felony and who receives, possesses, or transports in commerce any
firearm shall receive certain penalties enumerated therein.,,, The defendant argued that although he pled guilty to the prior offense, he
had never been convicted because imposition of sentence was suspended in his earlier case. Therefore, he was not subject to the stat-

ute."2 Affirming the defendant's conviction under the statute, the court

105. Raiford v. Abney, 695 F.2d 521 (11th Cir. 1983); De Cavalcante v. Commissioner, 620
F.2d 23 (3d Cir. 1980); Nathan v. Tenna Corp., 560 F.2d 761 (7th Cir. 1977); Hernandez-Uribe
v. United States, 515 F.2d 20 (8th Cir. 1975); Plunkett v. Commissioner, 465 F.2d 299 (7th Cir.
1972); In re Alsco-Harvard Fraud Litig., 523 F. Supp. 790 (D.D.C. 1981); United States v.
Krietemeyer, 506 F. Supp. 289 (S.D. Ill. 1980); Mayberry v. Somner, 480 F. Supp. 833 (E.D.
Pa. 1979).
106. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(f). See also FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.172(a) (requires the court to
satisfy itself that a factual basis exists for the pleas of guilty and nolo contendere).
107. See supra note 105 and accompanying text. The court, in United States v. $31,697.59
Cash, 665 F.2d 903 (9th Cir. 1982), gave collateral estoppel effect to a conviction based on a
guilty plea even though the Rule 11 requirements were not met. Id. at 905. The court reasoned
that the defendant did not timely avail himself of the avenues for contesting the conviction such
as appeal. Id. at 906.
108. 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
109. Id. at 242.
110. 696 F.2d 566 (8th Cir. 1982).
111. Id. at 567.
112. Id. at 568.
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stated that "[t]he federal courts have clearly established that a voluntary plea of guilty is a conviction."" 3 In McCrae v. State,14 the Florida
Supreme Court ruled a guilty plea to a felony involving the use or
threat of violence to the person was itself a conviction. Thus, it could
be used as an, aggravating circumstance in determining the propriety
of imposing the death penalty in a capital case even though the court,
in the prior case, had not yet adjudicated the defendant guilty of the
prior offense.115 The court cited Boykin and stated 'these decisions
recognize that once a plea of guilty has been accepted by a court, it
is the conviction and the only remaining step is the formal entry of
11 6
judgment and the imposition of sentence."

Thus, the only logical interpretation one may give to the term
"conviction," as that term is used in the VWPA, is that guilty pleas
constitute "convictions" that trigger operation of the collateral estoppel
provisions of the Act. Courts, however, have consistently refused to
give collateral estoppel effect to convictions based on pleas of nolo
contendere reasoning that such a plea constitutes an admission1 7only
for the purpose of the criminal proceeding in which it is made.
Cases that have decided the issue of whether collateral estoppel
effect should be given to convictions based upon pleas of guilty or
nolo contendere when used in subsequent civil proceedings applied
traditional rules relating to the doctrine of collateral estoppel. One
case that has considered the issue when interpreting the VWAPA is
8 The Satterfield court was primarily
United States v. Satterfield."1

113. Id. at 569.
114. 395 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1980). A guilty plea constitutes a conviction in other states as
well. See, e.g., State v. Superior Court, 138 Ariz. 4, 6, 672 P.2d 956, 958 (Ct. App. 1983) ("jt]he
popular meaning of the term conviction refers to the time when a person has been found guilty
or has plead [sic] guilty even though there has been no sentence or judgment by the court");
State v. Akana, 706 P.2d 1300, 1303 (Haw. 1985) ("the word 'conviction' is more commonly used
and understood to mean a verdict of guilty or a plea of guilty"); Sands v. State, 9 Md. App.
71, 79, 262 A.2d 583, 588 (App. 1970) (the court distinguished between a conviction and sentence
by stating that a "[c]onviction is the determination of guilt of an accused; sentence is the
judgment entered thereon").
115. Id. at 1154.
116. 395 So. 2d at 1154.
117. Raiford v. Abney, 695 F.2d 521 (11th Cir. 1983); United States v. One Chevrolet
Stylemaster Sedan, 91 F. Supp. 272 (D. Colo. 1950); Barnsdall Ref. Corp. v. Birnamwood Oil
Co., 32 F. Supp. 308 (E.D. Wis. 1940).
FED. R. EVD. 410 & FLA. STAT. § 90.410 (1987) both provide that a plea of nolo contendere

is inadmissible in any civil or criminal proceedings subject to certain limited exceptions.
118. 743 F.2d 827 (11th Cir. 1984).
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concerned with the constitutionality of the restitution provisions of
the Act. In holding that the collateral estoppel provisions of the VWPA
do not violate the seventh amendment, the court stated:
The facts underlying a criminal offense that give rise to a
restitution order will be given collateral estoppel effect only
if they were fully and fairly litigated at the criminal trial,
or stipulated through a guilty plea. See Raiford, 695 F.2d
at 523 (guilty plea given same collateral estoppel effect as
any other criminal convictions; plea of nolo contendere distinguished).,1
Therefore, guilty verdicts rendered after trial and pleas of guilty will
be accorded collateral estoppel effect under the VWPA in subsequent
civil proceedings while uncertainty exists concerning convictions based
on pleas of nolo contendere.
However, despite the language in Satterfield and the decisions
applying traditional rules that refuse to give collateral estoppel effect
to convictions based on pleas of nolo contendere, compelling arguments
exist to give such convictions collateral estoppel effect under the
VWPA. Because the VWPA requires a "conviction" to trigger operation
of the collateral estoppel provisions of the statutes, the issue is a
matter of statutory interpretation. Thus, one must determine whether
a judgment entered in a criminal case pursuant to a plea of nolo
contendere constitutes a "conviction" within the meaning of the Act.
The Sokoloff v. Saxbe court states the general rule adopted by a
majority of courts concerning the effect of a nolo contendere plea.' °

119. Id. at 838.
120. 501 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1974); see also United States v. Brzoticky, 588 F.2d 773, 775
(10th Cir. 1978) (the court holds that whether a nolo contendere plea to a state charge of larceny
was a "conviction" for purposes of a federal offense was to be determined by reference to state
law, and in Colorado this plea has application beyond the original case); Ruis-Rubio v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 380 F.2d 29 (9th Cir. 1967) (the court holds that an INS judgment
finding an alien guilty of violation of marijuana statutes on a plea of nolo contendere constituted
a "conviction"); United States v. Bruno, 98 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1938) (the court reasons that a
plea of nolo contendere is as conclusive of suit for all purposes as is a plea of guilty); Chesebrough
v. State, 255 So. 2d 675 (Fla. 1971) (the court holds that a plea of nolo contendere has the same
effect as a plea of guilty in supporting a conviction of the offense charged). In State v. Lillo,
506 So. 2d 94 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1987), the defendant was charged with bookmaldng under a
statute that specifically provides that "any person convicted under... this subsection shall not
have adjudication of guilt . . . withheld." FLA. STAT. § 849.25(2) (1987). The defendant pled
nolo contendere and the trial court withheld adjudication of guilt despite the provisions of the
statute. The court reversed the lower court's judgment and stated that "[iut is clear that the
term convicted as used in the statute also encompasses a plea of nolo contendere." 506 So. 2d
at 94.
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The court stated "[w]here as here, a statute (or judicial rule) attaches
legal consequences to the fact of a conviction, the majority of courts
have held that there is no valid distinction between a conviction upon
a plea of nolo contendere and a conviction after a guilty plea or trial." 1
The court held a physician's plea of nolo contendere to illegally distributing drugs constituted a conviction.,- The state could use this
conviction to revoke his license to distribute or dispense drugs pursuant to a statute that provided such a license could be revoked when
the licensee has been convicted of a felony under any law relating to

controlled substances.m
Several courts have discussed the effect of a nolo contendere plea.
In PensacolaLodge No. 497 v. State,'? the court held when a plea of
nolo contendere is accepted, it is not necessary for the court to adjudge
the defendant guilty in order to pass sentence because that follows
as a legal inference from the implied confession in the plea. The court
stated "the court should adjudge that the defendant is convicted of
the offense charged, and the sentence which follows should impose
the penalty as provided by law."' ' The court in Chesebrough v. State2

For examples of decisions from other states holding that a plea of nolo contendere constitutes
a conviction, see Bear v. Nicholls, 142 Ariz. 560, 562, 691 P.2d 326, 328 (Ct. App. 1984) ("the
majority of other states hold that a conviction based upon a plea of nolo contendere subjects
the defendant to all the consequences of a conviction in the same way as if it were after a plea
of guilty or not guilty"); People v. Goodwin, 593 P.2d 326, 328 (Colo. 1979) ("[tlhe judgment
entered upon a plea of nolo contendere is a 'conviction"'); Handelsman v. Division of N.J. Real
Estate Comm'n, 101 N.J. Super. 244, 251, 244 A.2d 131, 134 (Ct. App. Div. 1968) ("[ilt is
immaterial whether that conviction is a result of a plea of guilty, or nolo contendere. The word
'conviction' encompasses the sentence after a plea of nolo contendere, not the plea standing
alone' (emphasis omitted) (quoting Kravis v. Hock, 136 N.J.L. 161, 54 A.2d 778 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1947); Dower v. Poston, 76 Misc. 2d 721, 724, 351 N.Y.S.2d 272, 276 (Sup. Ct.
1973) (in discussing the effect of a plea of nolo contendere the court stated "[alt least it is a
conviction of the crime to which such a plea is taken'); State v. Gobern, 423 A.2d 1177, 1179
(R.I. 1981) ("once the nolo plea is entered, it is as much a conviction as a jury-returned guilty
verdict against the pleader would have been, and jeopardy attaches with the acceptance of the

plea").
121. 501 F.2d at 574.
122. Id. at 574-75.
123. Id.
124. 74 Fla. 498, 77 So. 613 (1917).
125. Id. at 500, 77 So. at 614.
126. 255 So. 2d 675 (Fla. 1971). The defendant was charged with committing a lewd and
lascivious act in the presence of a child under fourteen years of age. The defendant filed a
motion to suppress a statement she had made while in custody. The court denied the motion,
and the defendant subsequently pled nolo contendere to the charge. The defendant appealed
the conviction claiming, among other things, that the lower court erred in denying the motion
to suppress. The court held that the defendant waived the right to challenge the lower court's
ruling by entering the nolo contendere plea. Id. at 677.
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recognized "a plea of nolo contendere does not estop the defendant to
plead and prove innocence in a civil suit." Discussing the effect of
a nolo contendere plea, the court also stated "such a plea has the same
effect as a plea of guilty, so far as regards the proceeding on the
information, and a defendant who is sentenced to imprisonment upon
such a plea is convicted of the offense charged."' In Maxwell v.
State," the defendant pled nolo contendere to a prior offense of possession of marijuana. The state attempted to use that prior conviction
to prosecute the defendant for a second offense with enhanced penalties. 130 The defendant argued his first offense did not result in a conviction because he pled nolo contendere and adjudication of guilt was
withheld. 1"' The court rejected that argument and held the defendant
was convicted of the first offense even though he pled nolo contendere
and adjudication of guilt was withheld. 12
Further considerations imply that collateral estoppel doctrines
should apply to nolo contendere pleas. First, a plea of nolo contendere
can be made and accepted in a capital case. 1" If a consequence of
entering such a plea in a capital case can be the imposition of life in
prison or the death penalty, it seems logical to allow this plea to result
in the application of the collateral estoppel provisions of the VWPA
to any civil proceeding brought by the victim against the defendant.
Second, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 3.172134 requires
the trial judge to satisfy himself that a factual basis exists for the
plea of nolo contendere as well as the plea of guilty before he accepts.
Thus, the same procedural safeguards are accorded to the defendant
who enters a plea of nolo contendere in a Florida court that are

127. Id. at 676-77.
128.

Id. at 676.

129. 336 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1976). Significantly, the prior conviction consisted of
a nolo contendere plea and a withheld of adjudication of guilt. See also infra note 148 and
accompanying text.
130. Id. at 659.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Seay v. State, 286 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 1973). The defendants challenged the selection of
the grand jury that returned the indictments against them. One defendant pled nolo contendere
to three charges of forcible rape prior to trial. The court held such a plea could be made and
accepted in a capital case stating that such a plea "is in effect a 'guilty plea."' Id. at 536. The
court affirmed the convictions reasoning that by entering the plea of nolo contendere, the
defendant waived the right to challenge the validity of the grand jury.
134. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.172(a) states that "[blefore accepting a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere the trial judge shall satisfy himself that the plea is voluntarily entered and that
there is a factual basis for it." Id.
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accorded the guilty pleader under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
Rule ll(f).1- The courts that give guilty pleas collateral estoppel effect,
when applying the traditional rules of collateral estoppel, reason that
the procedural safeguards required by the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure render these pleas a sufficiently reliable determination of
same reasonthe facts constituting the elements of the offense. '16That
ing should also apply with equal force to giving collateral estoppel
effect to pleas of nolo contendere entered in the Florida courts. Therefore, the term "conviction," as used in the VWPA, should be interpreted to mean a plea of nolo contendere constitutes a conviction
sufficient to trigger the collateral estoppel provisions of the Act.
2. Withheld Adjudications of Guilt
Generally, when a criminal defendant enters a plea to the crime
charged or a verdict of guilty is returned against him after trial, the
court will enter judgment finding the defendant guilty.137 A judgment
of guilt rendered by a court should pose no problem in triggering
operation of the collateral estoppel provision of the VWPA. However,
Florida courts are also empowered to withhold adjudication of guilt
after a plea has been accepted or after a verdict of guilty has been
rendered, if the court places the defendant on probationlas Because

135. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(f). The Federal Rule does not require the trial judge to satisfy
himself that a factual basis exists for a plea of nolo contendere as does the Florida Rule.
136. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
137. See FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.670, which provides in pertinent part that:
If the defendant is found guilty, a judgment of guilty, and, if he has been acquitted,
a judgment of not guilty, shall be rendered in open court and in writing, signed
by the judge, filed, and recorded. However, the judge may withhold such adjudication of guilt if he places the defendant on probation.
Id.
138. Id. The statutory authority for FLA. R. CRIMP. 3.670 is found in FLA. STAT. §
948.01(3) (1987), which provides:
If it appears to the court upon a hearing of the matter that the defendant is not
likely again to engage in a criminal course of conduct and that the ends of justice
and the welfare of society do not require that the defendant presently suffer the
penalty imposed by law, the court, in its discretion, may either adjudge the defendant to be guilty or stay and withhold the adjudication of guilt; and, in either case,
it shall stay and withhold the imposition of sentence upon such defendant and shall
place him upon probation.
Id.
The rule and statute give the trial judge the discretionary authority to withhold adjudication
of guilt and place a defendant found guilty after either a plea or a trial, on probation. The sole
purpose of this procedure is to help rehabilitate the criminal defendant by giving him a second
chance in life without carrying around the burdens imposed by a criminal record. Should the
defendant fail to successfully complete his probation, the court may then adjudicate the defendant
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the court does not adjudicate the defendant guilty of the alleged crime
when it withholds adjudication of guilt, the issue is whether such a
judgment constitutes a "conviction" as required under the VWPA for
collateral estoppel to apply. Courts have not decided this precise issue.
However, Florida courts have tangentially dealt with this issue when
deciding cases involving the question of what constitutes a conviction
for purposes of statutory or rule construction.
In Smith v. State,1 9the state charged the defendant under a statute
precluding the sale of intoxicating liquor in a dry county by a person
who had been previously "convicted" of the same offense. The information only alleged the defendant had previously pled guilty to a like
offense. 140 Thus, the defendant placed in issue whether proof of a guilty
plea constituted a prior conviction under the statute or whether proof
of an adjudication of guilt by the court is required. Deciding an adjudication of guilt by the court would be required to prove a prior conviction under the statute, the court stated:
This court has so often expressed the opinion that the word
"conviction" includes the judgment of the court, as well as
a plea or verdict of guilty, that such definition of the word
as used in the statute or plea invoked to describe the effect
of a former conviction in a subsequent cause may be said to
be firmly established."''
However, despite this rather clear definition of the term "conviction," Florida courts, in more recent decisions dealing with the mean-

guilty and impose sentence on him. However, one of the primary purposes of the VWPA is to
protect the rights of crime victims by requiring the defendant to make restitution to his victim

as well as providing the victim with the collateral estoppel provisions of the Act. See supra
note 10 and accompanying text. The rehabilitative purposes of allowing a court to withhold

adjudication of guilt should not interfere with the primary objective of the VWPA in protecting
the rights of crime victims. The goal of rehabilitating the criminal defendant through the procedures set out in the rule and statute, as well as the goal of protecting the rights of crime victims

through the collateral estoppel provisions of the VWPA, can both be fulfilled by interpreting
the term "conviction" as found in the VWPA to include withheld adjudications of guilt.
There are some statutes that specifically forbid the courts from withholding adjudication
of guilt despite the provisions of FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.670 and FLA. STAT. § 948.01(3) (1987).
For example, FLA. STAT. § 849.25(2) (1987) specifically provides that any person convicted of

bookmaldng shall not have adjudication of guilt withheld. FLA. STAT. § 316.656(1) (1987) also
provides that no court may withhold adjudication of guilt for a conviction of driving under the
influence of alcohol or drugs, for manslaughter resulting from the operation of a motor vehicle,
or for vehicular homicide.
139. 75 Fla. 468, 78 So. 530 (1918).
140. Id. at 473-74, 78 So. 2d at 531.
141. Id. at 473-75, 78 So. at 532.
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ing of "conviction" in a variety of contexts, have adopted different42
definitions depending upon the situation in which the term is used.'
For example, in Jones v. State,'" the defendant was charged with
third degree murder and manslaughter arising from the death of the
same person. Following a jury verdict, the trial court adjudicated the
defendant guilty of third degree murder and withheld adjudication of
guilt on the manslaughter verdict.'" The defendant argued he could
not be convicted of both third degree murder and manslaughter for
the same death. 145 Thus, the defendant placed in issue whether the
withheld adjudication of guilt on the manslaughter verdict constituted
a conviction.'4 The court agreed that the withheld adjudication did
constitute a conviction, and vacated that judgment.1 47 Citing Maxwell
v. State,' and Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 3.701(d)(2),149
the court stated that 'the withholding of adjudication is a conviction
for many purposes. ' 't °

142. See Barber v. State, 413 So. 2d 482, 483 nn. 1 & 2 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1982); see also
infra notes 143, 148 & 155. One federal court has held that a withheld adjudication of guilt by
a Florida court constitutes a conviction under Florida law. In United States v. Harstfield, 387
F. Supp. 16 (M.D. Fla. 1975), the defendant was charged with knowingly making a false statement in connection with the purchase of a gun. Id. at 17. The defendant had stated on a purchase
form that he was not currently under indictment or information for any pending criminal charges.
Id. The defendant had earlier pled guilty in a Florida court under an information charging him
with receiving stolen property. Id. The trial court withheld adjudication of guilt. Id. The government argued that by doing so the court technically left the criminal charge pending against
him and the defendant, therefore, made a false statement when he signed the purchase form.
The court stated that the issue is whether the defendant was convicted under Florida law,
thereby precluding any further prosecution under the information. Id. The court dismissed the
case and held that the defendant was convicted in the Florida court even though adjudication
of guilt was withheld. Id. at 18. The court specifically stated it was "convinced that under
Florida law the defendant would be considered convicted upon the entry of his plea of guilty." Id.
143. 502 So. 2d 1375 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1987).
144. Id. at 1377.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1377-78.
148. 336 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1976). The court specifically held, in determining the
habitual offender status of the defendant under FLA. STAT. § 775.084 (1974), that it was 'the
legislature's view that withholding of adjudication is to be treated as a judgment of conviction
for purposes of subsequent punishments, at least where the second crime is committed during
the probationary period." Id. at 660. If a withheld adjudication of guilt constitutes a conviction
for purposes of determining subsequent punishment as a habitual offender, it would be both
consistent and logical to require that withheld adjudications of guilt also constitute convictions
under the collateral estoppel provisions of the VWPA.
149. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.701(d)(2). See infra note 158.
150. 502 So. 2d 1377.
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In Maxwell, the defendant had entered a plea of nolo contendere
to the charge of misdemeanor possession of marijuana, and adjudication
of guilt was withheld. 151 Shortly thereafter, the state charged the
defendant with felony possession of marijuana alleging that was defendant's second offense.' 52 The defendant moved to dismiss the charge
of felony possession because he had not previously been convicted of
a like offense. 15 3 The court refused to dismiss the second charge, stating
that withholding adjudication of guilt will be treated as a judgment
of conviction for purposes of subsequent punishments.'5
A similar case is State v. Gazda,53 wherein the court distinguished
between a "conviction" and a "judgment of conviction" for purposes
of construing Florida Statutes section 775.14. This statute provides a
five year time limitation to sentence a criminal defendant who received
a withheld sentence. 5 6 The court held that for the purposes of applying
that statute, the term "conviction" means determination of guilt by
jury verdict or by guilty plea, and does not require adjudication by
the court. 57 Additionally, the Florida Supreme Court was apparently
aware of the problems regarding the sentencing guidelines when a
criminal defendant had a history of criminal offenses and adjudication of guilt was withheld. The court solved this problem by adopting
Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 3.701(d)(2), 5 8 which states
that "conviction means a determination of guilt resulting from plea or
trial, regardless of whether adjudication was withheld or whether
imposition of sentence was suspended."' 59
It is apparent that there is no precise definition of the term
"conviction" that can be used in all cases. Rather, the courts will
define that term in accordance with the context within which it is
used and the circumstances of the particular case. Therefore, we

151.

336 So. 2d at 659.

152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155.

257 So. 2d 242 (Fla. 1971).

156. FLA. STAT. § 775.14 (1971).
157.

257 So. 2d at 243-44.

158. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.701(d)(2). This rule is part of the sentencing guidelines, found in
FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.701, which are designed "to establish a uniform set of standards to guide
the sentencing judge in the sentence decision madng process." FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.701(b). If
a withheld adjudication constitutes a conviction for purposes of determining a proper sentence
under the guidelines, then a withheld adjudication of guilt should constitute a conviction for
purposes of determining the defendant's liability to the victim in a subsequent civil suit pursuant
to the collateral estoppel provisions of the VWPA.
159. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.701(d)(2).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol40/iss3/1

30

Sawaya: Use of Criminal Convictions in Subsequent Civl Proceedings: Statu
STATUTORY COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL

must examine the context within which the term "conviction" is used
in the VWPA relative to the collateral estoppel provisions contained
therein and the legislative purpose when those provisions were enacted
into law.
The primary intent of Congress and the Florida legislature in enacting the VWPA was to strengthen existing legal protections for crime
victims, and to develop additional legislative proposals towards that
end.160 One proposal that became law was the enactment of the collateral estoppel provisions of the VWPA. These provisions are designed
to eliminate a crime victim's need to establish a criminal defendant's
liability in a civil suit for damages.11 The legislative intent for the
enactment of those provisions'3 would be severely frustrated by allowing a criminal defendant to escape their applicability simply because
the criminal trial judge exercised his discretion in withholding adjudication of guilt. Many courts withhold adjudication of guilt, yet still
require the defendant to make restitution to his victim. Since imposing restitution on a defendant is not dependent on that defendant
being formally adjudicated guilty by the court, application of the collateral estoppel provisions of the VWPA should not be dependent on
whether the trial judge exercises his discretion in either adjudicating
the defendant guilty or withholding adjudication.
Furthermore, if withholding adjudication of guilt becomes a controlling factor in preventing the victim from utilizing the collateral estoppel
provisions of the VWPA, trial judges may become reluctant to exercise
the power to withhold adjudication. This result would deprive the
deserving victim of a very powerful and useful provision of the law
in his attempts to be made whole through litigation in the civil courts.
This potential reluctance by courts would also be a great detriment
to a first offender who might deserve another chance without a criminal
conviction on his record.
Courts have shown a reluctance to adhere to a fixed definition of
the term "conviction" in all cases because that would work a severe

160.
161.
162.
163.
434 So.

See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Warzybok v. State, 505 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1987); Rose v. State,
2d 1014 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1983). In Rose, the defendant was charged by three separate

informations with various counts of forgery, uttering a forgery, depositing a check with intent
to defraud, and obtaining property by worthless check. 434 So. 2d at 1014. The defendant pled

guilty to some of the counts, and the state agreed to nol prosse the others. Id. The trial court
withheld adjudication of guilt but required that the defendant make restitution to his victims.
Id. at 1015. On appeal, the court held this was proper because it rehabilitated the defendant
and protected the public's interest. Id.
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injustice and hardship in many situations. Depriving the crime victim
of the use of the collateral estoppel provisions of the VWPA because
a trial judge discretionarily withheld adjudication of guilt would certainly create such a situation. Therefore, for purposes of triggering
the collateral estoppel provisions of the VWPA, a withheld adjudication
of guilt should be considered a "conviction," and proof of the defendant's plea or verdict of guilty rendered after trial should be sufficient
to meet that threshold requirement.
C.

Offense That Gives Rise to Restitution

The victim must establish the defendant was convicted of an offense
involving the act giving rise to restitution under the VWPA. Generally,
this will not be difficult because the court in the criminal proceedings
will have made that finding when it entered its restitution order.' G4
The criminal court's determination should be sufficient to establish
this requirement in the civil proceeding. However, cases may arise

164. Both the Federal and Florida VWPA's require the court to order the defendant to
make restitution to the victim unless it finds reasons not to so order. 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a) (Supp.
1986); FLA. STAT. § 775.089(1)(a) (1987). If the court does not order restitution, then it must
state its reasons on the record. 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(2) (Supp. 1986); FLA. STAT. § 775.089(1)(b)
(1987). In determining whether to order restitution and the amount, if any, the court must
consider the victim's losses incurred, the defendant's financial resources, the defendant's earning
capability along with the defendant and his family's financial needs, and any other factors the
court deems appropriate. 18 U.S.C. § 3664(a) (Supp. 1986); FLA. STAT. § 775.089(6) (1987). See
also Thrasher v. State, 528 So. 2d 474 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1987) (in considering the loss sustained
by the victim, the court reversed an order of restitution for money taken from a vending machine
during a burglary because that money was returned to the victim by the sheriffs office); Thomas
v. State, 517 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1987) (the court must consider the financial resources
of the defendant and provide him with a hearing prior to imposition of restitution); Spivey v.
State, 501 So. 2d 698 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1987) (in ordering restitution the court shall consider the
defendant's financial resources including the financial needs and earning ability of the defendant
and his dependents). The court's findings regarding the victim's damages and the defendant's
financial resources and ability to pay should not affect the applicability of the collateral estoppel
provisions of the Act. However, any amount paid to the victim under an order granting restitution
shall be set off against any amount recovered as damages in any subsequent civil proceeding
brought by the victim. 18 U.S.C. § 3579(e)(2) (1982) (renumbered18 U.S.C. § 3663(e)(2) (Supp.
1986)). The Florida statute also provides that the amount of any restitution awarded in an order
of restitution shall be set off against "any subsequent independent civil recovery." FLA. STAT.
§ 775.089(8) (1984).
The federal VWPA contains a unique provision that allows the court to decline to enter an
order of restitution when it "determines that the complications and prolongation of the sentencing
process resulting from the fashioning of an order of restitution . . . outweighs the need to
provide restitution to any victims." 18 U.S.C. § 3663(d) (Supp. 1986). The fact that the criminal
court declined to order restitution under this statute would not preclude the plaintiff from
evoking the collateral estoppel provisions of the VWPA in a subsequent civil proceeding.
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where the court did not order restitution in the criminal proceedings.
The fact that the criminal court did not order restitution does not
preclude application of the collateral estoppel provisions of the VWPA
if the plaintiff can establish this prerequisite in the civil proceeding.
Therefore, determining whether the offense involves an act that gives
rise to restitution under the VWPA can be vitally important.
The federal VWPA provides that the court "when sentencing a
defendant convicted of an offense... may order.., that the defendant
make restitution to any victim of such offense." 16 Therefore, the term
"offense" describes the criminal act for which restitution may be ordered. However, the federal VWPA does not contain a precise definition of the term "offense." The wording of the statutes can be interpreted to mean that the defendant may be ordered to make restitution
only to those persons who suffered injury as a result of actions and
conduct that are necessary elements of the offense for which he was
charged and convicted. On the other hand, the statute may be interpreted to require restitution for injury or damage as a result of the
defendant's actions or conduct that relate to or surround the commission of the offense regardless of whether the actions or conduct are
elements of the crime charged. An example of a case where the results
of criminal conduct arose from the defendant's actions that did not
constitute an element of the offense for which he was charged and
convicted is United States v. Durham.'6 The defendant was charged
with bank robbery.'6 During the course of the bank robbery, the

165. 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a) (Supp. 1986). It is interesting to note that the federal statute
provides that the court "may" order restitution while its Florida counterpart, FLA. STAT. §
775.089(l)(a) (1987) states that the court "shalt" order restitutiton. At first blush, it would
appear that the federal statute gives the court discretion in ordering restitution, while the
Florida statute does not. However, given the priority of protecting victims' rights established
by Congress and further articulated in the legislative history of the Act, see supra notes 10-13,
it is clear that the courts must award restitution under the federal VWPA unless the court
states on the record its reasons for not doing so. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663(2) (Supp. 1986). Qne
Florida court that decided this issue in Grice v. State, 528 So. 2d 1347 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1988).
The court held that FLA. STAT. § 775.089 (1987) is mandatory and requires the trial court to
consider restitution "as a part of every sentencing." Id. at 1350. The court also stated that any
"sentence imposed without reference to the restitution requirement was incomplete and subject
to modification by the court under Rule 3.800, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure." Id. The
court further held that correcting such an incomplete sentence does not constitute an enhancement of punishment. Id. The dissent argued that the statute imposes a discretionary duty upon
the court to order restitution and further argued that any modification of a criminal sentence
to include restitution would be enhancement of punishment and therefore prohibited. Id. at 1351.
166. 755 F.2d 511 (6th Cir. 1985). The court awarded restitution to the car owner used in
the getaway by giving an expansive definition to the term "victim" in the VWPA.
167. Id. at 512.
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defendant destroyed by arson an automobile belonging to someone
else. 1' The issue arose whether the owner of the car used in the
getaway and later destroyed in the fire should receive restitution when
the defendant was only convicted of bank robbery. 16 This case
exemplifies the dilemma trial judges may face when interpreting the
VWPA. Should judges give a limited interpretation to the statute and
order restitution only for the defendant's conduct that constitutes an
element of the offense for which he was charged and convicted? Or
should judges interpret the statute broadly to include restitution for
damage or injury that are the results of the defendant's conduct arising
from the commission of the criminal offense even though this conduct
was not an element of that offense?
The 1983 version of Florida Statutes section 775.089(1)170 provided

'the court may order the defendant to make restitution.., for damage
or loss caused by the defendant's offense."' 7' That statute was subsequently amended by chapter 84-363, Laws of Florida, and renumbered as Florida Statutes section 755.089(1)(a). 172 It provides that 'the
court shall order the defendant to make restitution

. . .

for damage

or loss caused directly or indirectly by the defendant's offense." 1 7 The
legislature's inclusion of the words "directly or indirectly" certainly
evidences its intention that courts give the statute a very broad interpretation. This interpretation should include restitution for related
offenses resulting in damage due to the criminal's conduct that may
not form an element of the offense for which he was convicted. Thus,
this section will examine the Florida and federal cases that have grappled with the problem of interpreting these pertinent provisions of
the VWAPA, and briefly discuss some of the decisions of other jurisdictions that have given a narrow interpretation to similar statutory
terms.
1. The Broad Interpretation
a. The Florida Cases
Few cases have interpreted the Florida VWPA to determine what
criminal conduct will give rise to restitution under the Act. The decisions rendered under the 1983 statute 74 do not require that the offense

168. Id.
169.
170.
171.

Id.
FLA. STAT. § 775.089(1) (1983).
Id.

172. FLA. STAT. § 775.089(1)(a) (Supp. 1984).
173. Id.
174. FLA. STAT. § 775.089(1) (1983).
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charged bear a direct relationship to the damages caused by the criminal conduct nor must the offense charged describe the damage done
in order to support a restitution order. 175 However, courts have required that the damage bear a significant relationship to the offense
for which the defendant is convicted. 176 The case of Jones v. State'7
is illustrative. The defendant was originally charged with burglary
and dealing in stolen property. 78 As a result of a plea agreement with
the state, the defendant was allowed to plead guilty to the crime of
dealing in stolen property in exchange for which the state dismissed
the burglary chargeY7 The court ordered the defendant to make restitution to the owner of the home where the burglary occurred.18 The
defendant argued the restitution order was improper because the home
owner's loss resulted from the crime of burglary for which he was not
convicted.""' The court disagreed and held the damages did bear a
significant relationship to the offense for which the defendant was
convicted.8 However, the court did not allow restitution for the repair
of a broken window and screen because the court found that damage
was caused during the burglary and had no relationship to the offense
for which the defendant was convicted.8 2
The court in Clibumrn v. State'8 4 reached a different result under
similar facts. The defendant in Cliburn was also convicted of dealing
in stolen property, and the trial court ordered restitution to the home
owner where the burglary occurred for the value of the unrecovered
property.8 2 The court reversed the restitution order because there

175. Cliburn v. State, 510 So. 2d 1155 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1987); Jones v. State, 480 So. 2d
163 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1985).
176. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
177. 480 So. 2d at 163. The court stated the rule that 'itis not necessary that the offense
charged describe the damage done in order to support a restitution order but only that the
damage bear a significant relationship to the convicted offense" (quoting J.H.S. v. State, 472
So. 2d 737, 738 (Fla. 1985)). Id. at 164 (emphasis omitted).
178. Id.
179. Id. at 163-64.
180. Id. at 164.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. 510 So. 2d at 1155. In addition to the damage to the house caused during the commission
of the burglary, the trial court also ordered restitution for the victim's expense in traveling
back to attend to her damaged property. Id. at 1156. The appellate court, in striking that
award, held that even if the defendant had been convicted of the burglary, the travel expense
is too remote in nature and therefore improper. Id.
185. Id. at 1156.
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was no signficant relationship between the damages suffered and the
crime for which the defendant was convicted. 1' However, the court
did note there was no evidence in the record that the defendant was
even involved in the burglary or that he ever received the unrecovered
property stolen in the burglary. 1' Perhaps this case is distinguishable
from Jones in that the Jones defendant was originally charged with
the burglary, which indicates that some evidence existed linldng him
to that crime as well.
For the first time, the court was confronted with interpreting the
1985 version of the statute in Anderson v. State.'ss The defendant
entered a plea of guilty to one count of grand theft, and at the same
time entered a plea of no contest in a separate unrelated case to two
other counts of grand theft.189 The trial court entered an order in the
instant case requiring the defendant to pay restitution for the crimes
charged in the separate unrelated case. 19° In reversing that order, the
court held statutory restitution may be ordered only for loss sustained
by the victim as a result of the offense for which the defendant is
convicted. 191 The court further held there was no causal link between
the defendant's criminal activity in the instant case and the damages
sustained by the victims in the other unrelated case. 19
The Florida Supreme Court, in State v. Williams,1' applied both

the significant relationship test and the causation test in determining

186. Id. at 1156-57.
187. Id. at 1156.
188. 502 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1987). The court noted a contrary result in Rose v.
State, 434 So. 2d 1014 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1983), where the court awarded restitution to victims
of other unrelated crimes committed by the same defendant. The court justified the conflict in
the two decisions by noting that Rose was decided prior to the 1985 amendment of FLA. STAT.
775.089(1). 502 So. 2d at 1289. However, the amendment to the statute provides for a less
restrictive predicate for a restitution award than the original statute, by allowing awards for
damage caused either directly or indirectly by the criminal offense. Id. Therefore, the court's
explanation in Anderson for the conflict is not correct; apparently the conflict is inexplicable.
189. 502 So. 2d at 1289.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. 520 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 1988). In establishing the applicable test when determining whether
restitution is appropriate under FLA. STAT. § 774.089(I)(a) (1985), the court specifically stated
that the "significant relationship test does not replace the causal relationship required by §
775.089(1)(a). Rather, we believe that the significant relationship test . . . should work in
conjunction with the causation required by the statute." 520 So. 2d at 277. The court approved
the District Court's decision in Williams v. State, 505 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1987), which
was in direct conflict with Bowling v. State, 479 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1985). 520 So. 2d
at 277-78. In Williams, the District Court reversed the trial court's order of restitution reasoning
that 'the restitution order ...
could be construed to include not only damages resulting from
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whether restitution should be awarded pursuant to the 1985 version
of the statute. The defendant was convicted of leaving the scene of
an accident resulting in personal injuries, and was ordered to pay
restitution to her employer and insurance company. 1' The defendant
argued the damages were not caused either directly or indirectly by
her offense of leaving the scene of the accident. 195 The state contended
the defendant's conduct constituted a link in a chain of events in which
the injuries took place.19 The court reasoned that finding a significant
relationship between the damages and the offense, although required,
is not sufficient unless a causal connection is also established.'9 Because there was no determination that the damages were caused by
the defendant's act of leaving the scene of the accident, the court held
the award of restitution was improper. 19s
The Williams court, interpreting the 1985 statute, established a
two part test to determine whether restitution is appropriate. First,
the court must find a causal link between the damage sustained and
the criminal activity involved in the crime for which the defendant is
convicted. Second, the court must find a significant relationship between the damages and the criminal activity. Once these requisites
are established, restitution may be awarded under the statute.
b.

The Federal Cases

The majority of federal courts give the VWPA term "offense" a
narrow construction by interpreting that term to require the defendant
to make restitution only to victims of the offense for which he was
charged and convicted.'9 However, those courts have compensated

appellant's criminal conduct of leaving the scene of an accident involving personal injuries, but
also damages arising from the accident itself." 505 So. 2d at 480. In applying the significant

relationship test, the court went on to hold that "we find . .. the latter construction would
bear 'some relationship' but not a 'significant relationship' to the crime for which appellant was
convicted." Id.
In Bowling, the defendant was involved in an automobile accident and subsequently convicted
of failure by one involved in an accident to stop and render aid to an injured person. 479 So.
2d at 147. The defendant was ordered to make restitution for the injuries sustained by the

other persons in the accident. Id. The court upheld the restitution award stating that "there
was no question that the probationer caused the accident and injuries as a result of his reckless
driving." Id. See also In re D.N. v. State, 529 So. 2d 1217 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1988).

194.

520 So. 2d at 277.

195.

Id.

196.

Id.

197.
198.
199.
F.2d 125

Id.
Id. at 278.
United States v. Hill, 798 F.2d 402 (10th Cir. 1986); United States v. Mounts, 793
(6th Cir. 1986); United States v. Durham, 755 F.2d 511 (6th Cir. 1985).
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for their narrow definition of the term "offense" with their broad
interpretation of the term "victim." For example, the court in United
States v. Durham defined the term "victim" to include "any person
who suffered as a result of the defendant's actions that surrounded
the commission of the offense, regardless of whether the actions are
elements of the offense charged."' 1 Thus, the court awarded restitution to the insurer of the automobile destroyed by arson during the
commission of the bank robbery even though the defendant was not
charged with arson.2
The defendant in United States v. Mounts,m while burglarizing a
business, attempted to blow up a safe using explosives he had taken
from another county. He fled the scene in a car, which he stole from
the business, and later collided with a truck causing damage to both
vehicles.2 The defendant pled guilty to being a convicted felon receiving explosives transported in interstate commerce.2 The court ordered
the defendant to make restitution to the business owner for the damage
sustained during the explosion of the safe and the damage to the
automobile.2 The defendant argued the losses were not directly
caused by the conduct for which he was convicted.m The court noted
the narrow definition given the term "offense" by the Durham court,
but gave a broad definition to the term "victim," and upheld the award
of restitution to the business owner for damages to the premises and
to the automobile.m The court reasoned the theft and destruction of
the vehicle was part of "an uninterrupted series of events surrounding
the criminal activity of the appellant."2 Similar case law holds that
restitution orders will not be limited by amounts of losses specified
in an indictment or to particular counts of an offense.210 In United
States v. Spinney, 2 1 the defendant was convicted of conspiracy to
200. 755 F.2d at 511.
201. Id. at 513.
202. Id. at 512-13 (it did not award restitution, it only upheld validity of trial court's award).
203. 793 F.2d at 125. The lower court refused to award restitution to the insurance company
which had partially reimbursed the owner of the damaged car as well as the owner of the truck,

because the defendant lacked the assets or financial resources to pay restitution. The VWPA
provides that it is proper for the court to consider these factors before awarding restitution.
18 U.S.C. § 3664(a) (Supp. 1986); FLA. STAT. § 775.089(6) (1987).
204. 793 F. 2d at 126.
205. Id.

206.

Id. at 127.

207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Id. at 126.
Id. at 126, 128.
793 F.2d at 128.
United States v. Hill, 798 F.2d 402 (10th Cir. 1986).
795 F.2d 1410 (9th Cir. 1986).
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commit assault, and ordered to pay restitution for medical expenses
incurred by one injured victim and funeral expenses for another deceased victim. The court held "a restitution order is authorized if the
defendant created the circumstances under which the harm or loss
occurred" and that "the government need not prove that the defendant
''
was directly responsible for the loss. 212
Other state courts have adopted a broad interpretation of their
restitution and probation statutes. 213 Such an interpretation of the
VWPA furthers one of the primary goals of the Act by providing
greater relief and compensation to those innocent victims who have
suffered damage or injury as a result of criminal conduct. However,
courts must be wary of extending this broad interpretation of the
VWPA too far as it may violate the constitutional due process rights
of the defendants.
2. The Narrow Interpretation
The narrow interpretation of the term "offense," as that term
applies to statutory provisions relating to restitution, seems to have
originated with those federal decisions interpreting the Federal Probation Act. This Act authorizes judges to order restitution only as a
condition of probation. 214 However, the Federal Probation Act contains
restrictive language that allows for restitution for losses "caused by
the offense for which conviction was had. '21r The federal VWPA does
not contain such limiting language. Several state courts have, however,
2
adopted the same limited interpretation. 16
The rationale behind applying this limited interpretation to restitution is that it ensures restitution is directly related only to the criminal
act for which the defendant is charged. This thereby ensures that the

212. Id.
213. See, e.g., State v. Cummings, 120 Ariz. 68, 583 P.2d 1389 (1978); People v. Lent, 15
Cal. 3d 481, 541 P.2d 545, 124 Cal. Rptr. 905 (1975); People v. Miller, 256 Cal. App. 2d 348,
64 Cal. Rptr. 20 (1967); People v. Pettit, 88 Mich. App. 203, 276 N.W.2d 878 (1979); Garski v.
State, 75 Wis. 2d 62, 248 N.W.2d 425 (1977).
214. 18 U.S.C. § 3561 (1982). See, e.g., United States v. Orr, 691 F.2d 431 (9th Cir. 1982)
(court held restitution must be limited to the amount for which the defendant was convicted);
Dougherty v. White, 689 F.2d 142 (8th Cir. 1982) (the court held that restitution could not be
ordered for counts that the government dismissed).
215. 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1982).
216. See, e.g., People v. Mahle, 57 Ill. 2d 279, 312 N.E.2d 267 (1974); State v. Labure, 427
So. 2d 855 (La. 1983); Mason v. State, 46 Md. App. 1, 415 A.2d 315 (1980); People v. Becker,
349 Mich. 476, 84 N.W.2d 833 (1957); People v. Lofton, 78 Misc. 2d 202, 356 N.Y.S.2d 791
(Crim. Ct. 1974).
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defendant has an opportunity to present any defense relating to that

issue. The difficulties presented by application of this approach center
around the limits its places on victim compensation.
D.

Procedural Use of the Statutes

In the typical civil proceeding, the plaintiff would generally plead
facts establishing the essential elements of the criminal offense. These
allegations will establish that the plaintiff is the crime victim, and
that the crime is an offense that gives rise to restitution under the
VWPA. Furthermore, the plaintiff should attach a certified copy of
the criminal court's judgment to the complaint. 217 The collateral estoppel effect of the statute should thereafter be raised in a motion for
proceedings relating to the issue
summary judgment. 218 Generally,21the
9
of liability should go no further.
217. The Florida and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that copies of documents
may be attached to the pleadings in a civil cause of action and that any document attached as
an exhibit shall be considered a part thereof for all purposes. FED. R. CiV. P. 10(c); FLA. R.
Crv. P. 1.130(a) & (b). See also FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.120(e), which provides that 'inpleading a
judgment or decree... it is sufficient to aver the judgment or decree without setting forth
matter showing jurisdiction to render it." Id. See also FED. R. Civ. P. 9(e) (this Federal Rule
is virtually identical to the Florida rule).
218. Both the Federal and Florida Rules of Civil Procedure provide procedures that allow
a party to a civil suit to obtain a favorable judgment prior to trial when that party can establish
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that he is entitled to a judgment as
a matter of law. FED. R. Civ. P. 56; FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.510. Because the defendant will be
estopped to deny the essential allegations of the offense for which he is convicted, those facts
will be deemed admitted. Therefore, as to those facts, there can exist no genuine issue and the
plaintiff consequently will be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law as to those issues.
219. In the event the entire issue of liability cannot be established by a motion for summary
judgment, the court may render a partial summary judgment as to those facts and issues that
exist without substantial controversy. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(d); FLA. R. Cirv. P. 1.510(d). At the
trial or final hearing, those facts so specified shall be deemed established. Therefore, the liability
issues relating to the criminal offense should never proceed any further than a motion for
summary judgment.
The courts generally will not grant summary judgment on the issue of the victim's damages
even though restitution may have been ordered in a specific amount in the criminal proceedings.
Appley v. West, 832 F.2d 1021 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Wight, 819 F.2d 485 (4th Cir.
1987).
In Appley, the plaintiff brought suit against an investment adviser and a bank alleging that
the defendant defrauded the plaintiff of substantial assets. 832 F.2d at 1022. The adviser had
previously pled guilty to two counts of mail fraud that were committed in furtherance of the
scheme to defraud the plaintiff. Id. at 1023. During the plea hearing, the government and the
defendant agreed that the minimum amount the defendant embezzled from the plaintiff was
$495,000. Id. However, the court found that the amount embezzled was $957,000, and ordered
the defendant to pay that amount in restitution. Id. The plaintiff thereafter filed a multi-count
complaint in a civil suit alleging damages under the RICO Act, which contains treble damage
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A decision that illustrates how collateral estoppel can be applied
through a motion for summary judgment is Bressan Export-Import
Co. v. Conlew.2 20 In Bressan,a shipment of shoes and sandals belonging
to the plaintiff was stolen.22 1 One defendant was convicted by a jury
trial of receiving and possessing goods stolen from interstate shipments, and the second defendant testified at trial that he sold those
stolen goods to the first defendant.- The second defendant was never
convicted. m The plaintiff then instituted a civil suit for conversion
against both defendants.224 He filed a motion for summary judgment
alleging that the conviction of the first defendant and the testimony
of the second defendant conclusively established the civil liability of
each. m In rejecting the mutuality rule, the court held a prior judgment

provisions. Id. at 1024. Other counts alleged fraudulent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary
duty, fraud, and deceit. Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that she was
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law because the defendant pled guilty and was ordered
to pay restitution in the amount of $957,000. Id. The court agreed and granted her motion for
summary judgment on all counts and trebled that amount under the RICO count. Id. On appeal,
the court held that the liability issue presented in all of the counts of the complaint except the
RICO count was properly established by giving collateral estoppel effect to the prior criminal
conviction. Summary judgment was, therefore, proper as to those issues. Id. at 1025-26. The
court, however, reversed the summary judgment on the issue of damages because the court
held that the amount of restitution was not a material fact on which the guilty plea was based
and because the issue of the amount of damages was not fully litigated in the criminal proceedings.
In Wight, the court held that the liability issue could be established by motion for summary
judgment by giving collateral estoppel effect to a prior conviction in a subsequent civil suit for
damages. 819 F.2d at 487. However, the court further held that the issue of damages could not
be decided by summary judgment based upon the collateral estoppel effect of the prior conviction
even though the amount of damages was pled in the information and the defendant entered a
plea of guilty to that information. Id. at 487-88. The court reasoned that the amount of damages
was not a necessary or essential element of the plea agreement the defendant entered, and that
the conviction of the defendant did not require proof of any particular amount of damages. Id.
at 488. Therefore, the issue of damages must, in most cases, be fully litigated in the civil
proceedings.
220. 346 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Penn. 1972). See, e.g., Glantz v. United States, 837 F.2d 23
(1st Cir. 1988) (collateral estoppel was applied defensively); Appley v. West, 832 F.2d 1021 (7th
Cir. 1987) (summary judgment was properly granted concerning liability issues on common law
counts but was improperly granted on issues of damages); United States v. Wight, 819 F.2d
484 (4th Cir. 1987) (summary judgment was properly granted on the liability issues only); Nathan
v. Tenna Corp., 560 F.2d 761 (7th Cir. 1977) (summary judgment granted when collateral
estoppel was applied defensively); County of Cook v. Lynch, 560 F. Supp. 136, 140 (N.D. Ill.
1982) ("collateral estoppel may compel a grant of summary judgment" where "a criminal conviction resolved factual questions underlying liability identical to facts supportive of civil liability").
221. 346 F. Supp. at 684.
222. Id. at 684-85.
223. Id. at 685.
224. Id.
225. Id.
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of conviction in a criminal proceeding for the same acts alleged in a
subsequent civil action may conclusively establish those issues against
the guilty defendant.m The court also ruled the criminal acts for which
the defendant was convicted constituted conversion.2 7 The court concluded that, as to the convicted defendant, there existed no dispute
as to any material fact, and granted the plaintiffs motion for summary
judgment.m However, as to the second defendant, the court denied
plaintiffs motion for summary judgment because the second defendant
was never convicted.m Testimony alone could not be used to deny
the second defendant his day in court.20
The party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden of
demonstrating the nonexistence of any genuine issue of material fact. 231
Once he tenders competent evidence to support the motion, the opposing party must produce evidence to reveal a genuine issue of material
fact. It is not enough merely to assert that such an issue does exist.2 3
The statutory collateral estoppel effect virtually denies the opposing
party's opportunity to produce sufficient counter-evidence to show the
existence of a material fact concerning the issues adjudicated in the
criminal proceeding because he is estopped to deny the essential allegations of the criminal offense. Therefore, once the plaintiff establishes
the conviction of the criminal offense that gives rise to restitution
under the VWPA, the court must grant summary judgment as to
those issues and facts. Determining the facts that established the
essential allegations of the criminal offense should not be difficult
because criminal offenses are typically codified in specific statutes
detailing the essential elements. Therefore, criminal statutes generally
present a clear guideline for determining what facts and issues were
established in the criminal proceeding.
The conscientious attorney can eliminate any doubt that may arise
regarding the facts and issues determined in the criminal proceeding
by carefully preparing his pleadings. The plaintiff can clearly present
the facts and issues established in the prior criminal proceeding by
attaching a certified copy of the court's judgment and copies of the
indictment or information that charged the defendant. The plaintiff
should also attach copies of the criminal statutes violated, relevant

226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 685-86.
230. Id. at 686.
231. Appley, 832 F.2d at 1021; Landers v. Milton, 370 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 1979).
232. See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
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portions of the trial transcript or the transcript of the court proceeding
where the plea was entered by the defendant, and written opinions
or orders of the trial or appellate courts. In this way, the plaintiffs
counsel can accurately plead the essential allegations of the criminal
offense for which the defendant was convicted.
V.

THE INTENTIONAL ACT EXCLUSION CLAUSE

A key factor in determining whether to pursue civil remedies for
damages against a convicted criminal is whether a potential judgment
will be collectible. Most convicted criminals resort to crime either
because they lack motivation to acquire assets legally or because they
lack education or skills to adequately provide for themselves or their
families. Regardless of why a particular person resorts to crime, most
criminals are either indigent or lack sufficient assets to satisfy a judgment of substantial amount. Deep pocket criminals are an exception,
and collecting a judgment against them may be relatively easy. m
Therefore, determining whether a convicted criminal has insurance
can be vitally important in deciding whether to seek damages in a
subsequent civil proceeding. Next, and more importantly, one must

233. A trend has developed over recent years toward increased prosecution of corporations
and other deep-pocket entities and individuals. See Fiske, Foreward, 18 Am. CRim. L. REV.
165, 167 (1980);
In the past few years, the Anaconda Company, Bear Stearns and Co., Bethlehem
Steel Corporation, Chemical Bank, Control Data Corporation, Firestone Tire and
Rubber Company, Lockheed Corporation, Mobil Corporation, Pepsico, Inc., Tenneco, Inc., Trextron, Inc., United Brands Company, United States Lines, Inc.,
Warner Communications, Inc., Westinghouse Electric Company Incorporated, and/
or one or more of their top executives have been indicted or convicted on a variety
of federal criminal charges.
Id.
The prosecution of Ford Motor Company for reckless homicide, Indiana v. Ford Motor Co.,
No. 5324 (Ind. Sup. Ct., Mar. 13, 1980), is a recent example of a criminal prosecution of a deep
pocket entity. Three women were killed when their 1973 Pinto automobile was struck from the
rear. The collision caused the gas tank to rupture resulting in the car bursting into flames, and
causing the death of the occupants. Ford was charged with knowingly manufacturing and selling
a defective car. Id. Although the jury acquitted Ford, the case illustrates the enormous impact
the collateral estoppel provisions of the VWPA could have on subsequent civil litigation. The
representatives of the decedents' estates would have been able to rely on the conviction to
establish the facts constituting the essential elements of the offense in any subsequent wrongful
death action. With the civil liability of Ford established by the criminal conviction, the only
issue the jury would have to decide would be the amount of damages Ford must pay to the
plaintiffs. Given the enormous damage awards juries have rendered in some recent personal
injury and wrongful death cases, the impact of applying the collateral estoppel provisions of the
VWPA becomes readily apparent.
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determine whether coverage exists under the insurance policy for the
incident that caused the injury. Most liability insurance contracts contain an exclusion from coverage for any intentional act by the insured;
this is commonly referred to as the intentional act exclusion clause.23
When the insured intentionally caused the harm, the insurer will invariably deny coverage under this exclusion.
Despite popular belief, courts have generally held an insured's
criminal conviction does not conclusively establish the insured's intent
for purposes of determining coverage under an intentional act exclusion
clause.m For example, in United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v.
Perez,26 the insured was convicted of second degree murder for firing
a gun into a crowd of people and killing the decedent. The court held
the insured's conviction did not defeat the insurance coverage because
the evidence showed the defendant fired the gun recklessly without
the intent to kill the decedent but only to frighten him.2 7 Courts will
generally apply the same analysis to instances giving rise to criminal
convictions as well as to those that do not. Thus, this section will
discuss the intentional act exclusion clause as it applies to determine
coverage for injuries arising out of criminal activity.m
A.

HistoricalDevelopment

Florida courts historically recognized an implied exclusion to liability coverage for harm intentionally caused by the insured. In Grange
Mutual Casualty Co. v. Thomas,239 the court recognized the well
settled principle of law that there can be no coverage under an insurance policy that insures against an "accident" where "the wrongful
act complained of is intentionally directed specifically toward the person injured by such act . . . ."m The court in Leatherby Insurance

234. George v. Stone, 260 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1972).
235. Clemmer v. Hartford Ins. Co., 22 Cal. 3d 865, 587 P.2d 1098, 151 Cal. Rptr. 285
(1978); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Perez, 384 So. 2d 904 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1980);
Continental Casualty Co. v. Parker, 161 Ga. App. 614, 288 S.E.2d 776 (1982); Patrons-Oxford
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 426 A.2d 888 (Me. 1981); Burd v. Sussex Mut. Ins. Co., 56 N.J. 383,
267 A.2d 7 (1970).
236. 384 So. 2d 904.
237. Id.

238. For purposes of this discussion the term "coverage" includes not only the insurer's
obligation to pay any judgment that may be rendered against the insured, but also includes

determination of whether the insured is liable for its failure to defend the underlying cause of
action brought against its insured.
239.
240.

301 So. 2d 158 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1974).
Id. at 159.
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Co. v. Willoughbyp 41 set forth the reasoning for this principle of law.
The court stated that "since such a policy was in essence an indemnification contract, public policy mandated that an intentional tort was
not an 'accident' within the coverage for the reason that he ought not
to be permitted to indemnify himself against his intentional [torts]."
In accord with these general principles of insurance law developed
by the courts, insurance companies began to include intentional act
exclusion clauses in their insurance contracts. Therefore, most contemporary liability insurance contracts provide coverage for damages due
to bodily injury or property damage caused by an "occurrence."4 The
term "occurrence" is generally defined as "an accident . . . which
results . . . in bodily injury and property damage neither expected
nor intended from the standpoint of the insured." This particular
language first appeared in insurance contracts after a major revision
of general liability insurance policies was concluded in 1966.2 5 Prior
to that time, the language utilized to exclude coverage for harm intentionally inflicted by the insured read as follows: "bodily injury . . .
'' 6
caused intentionally by or at the direction of the insured. 2
The pre-1966 language was utilized in liability insurance policies
based on the "accident" concept of insurance rather than the "occurrence" concept now found in most liability contracts. 24 7 Courts experienced considerable difficulties with the pre-1966 language when used
to help define the parameters of coverage in the accident-oriented
policies. For example, in Sontag v. Galer,2 the court held when determining the circumstances that would constitute an "accident," the
exclusive language "caused intentionally" signified that the perspective
is from the insured's standpoint rather than the victim's standpoint.
The court stated, "it is the state of the will of the person by whose
agency it was caused rather than that of the injured person which
determines whether an injury was accidental."' 9 However, some legal
authorities and, more importantly, courts disagreed and felt the
reasoning employed by the Sontag court ignored the fact that insurance

241.
242.
243.
FENSE,

315 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1975).
Id. at 554.
Sawaya, Coverage Under the CGL: A Gordian Knot of Interpretation,FOR THE DEMay, 1988, at 19.

244. Id. at 20.
245. Id.
246.
247.
248.
249.

Patrons-Oxford Mutual Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 426 A.2d 888, 890 (Me. 1981).
Sawaya, supra note 243.
279 Mass. 309, 181 N.E. 182 (1932).
Id. at 311, 181 N.E. at 183-84.
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is also for the benefit of the injured accident victims. Courts that
utilized this rationale considered whether the resulting injury was
intentionally caused from the victim's standpoint; and if the victim
perceived the harm as accidental, then the injury would be covered.an
In 1959, the National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters (Bureau)
and the National Insurance Rating Bureau (NIRB) began to develop
a standard form for insurance policies that alleviates the problems and
uncertainties caused by the accident-oriented policies.5 1 The Bureau
completed the work in 1966, and issued the Comprehensive General
Liability Insurance Policy that broadened coverage by substituting
the accident approach with the occurrence approach. 2 One major revision concerned the courts' disagreement as to whose perspective
should be considered in determining whether the harm was intentionally inflicted. The revised language, "from the standpoint of the insured," currently used in most liability insurance contracts was designed to clarify that the accident component of an "occurrence" is to
be evaluated from the insured's perspective rather than the injured
victim's perspective.
However, despite the efforts of the Bureau and the NIRB to clarify
the confusion and difficulties courts were having interpreting the intentional act exclusion clause, courts continued to have problems finding
a consensus of meaning and application of the clause. The problems
focused on the words 'intended" and "expected." Questions arose
whether these words signified only that the insured intended to do
the particular act from which-the bodily injury resulted; or do they
also mean the insured must have had the conscious objective to cause
the particular bodily injury resulting from his intentional act.2
250. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Worthington, 405 F.2d 683 (8th Cir. 1968);
Knight v. L.H. Bossier, Inc., 118 So. 2d 700 (La. App. 1960); Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Blackburn, 477 P.2d 62 (Okla. 1970); City of Burns v. Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co., 248 Or.
364, 434 P.2d 465 (1967).
251. Sawaya, supra note 243.
252. Id.
253. See Clemmons v. American States Ins. Co., 412 So. 2d 906 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1982).
The Clemmons court stated the problem as follows:
Apparently, cases considering similar problems have raised questions as to whether
the insured's intention had to relate to the insured's act, or to the immediate effect
or result of that act, or to an ultimate purpose or objective the insured intended
to accomplish by the act. An insured can intend to do an act but not intend the
immediate result; intend both act and immediate result; intend both act and immediate result but not an ultimate effect; or intend to do the act for one specific
effect or purpose and the act result in consequences other than those intended. Of
course, an insured can do and intend his act and intend to accomplish the act's
ultimate purpose and merely regret the immediate result that is necessary in order
for the act to achieve its intended ultimate purpose. We shall attempt to explain.
Id. at 908.
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As a result, two basic principles of law evolved.
B.

The Majority Rule
1. In General

The rule of construction adopted by Florida courts and a majority
of courts in other states is concisely stated in Allstate Insurance Co.
v. Steineme,2 as follows:
We believe the standard enunciated by the lower courts of
Florida adheres to the majority rule with respect to "intentional injury" exclusions. Under the majority rule the exclusion applies if the insured intended to do a particular act,
and intended to do some harm, even if the harm actually
done was radically different from that intended . . . . On
the other hand, an 'intentional injury" exclusion will not
apply if the insured intentionally does an act, but has no
intent to commit harm, even if the act involves the foreseeable consequences of great harm or even amounts to gross
or culpable negligence.ns

254. 723 F.2d 873 (11th Cir. 1984).
255. Id. at 875. The court in Cloud v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co., 248 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 3d D.C.A.
1971), also recognized this as the majority rule. For examples of decisions in other jurisdictions
adopting the majority rule, see Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Casualty Ins. Co. v. Dyer, 454 So.
2d 921 (Ala. 1984); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Hart, 162 Ga. App. 333, 291 S.E.2d 410 (1982);
Farmers Ins. Group v. Sessions, 100 Idaho 914, 607 P.2d 422 (1980); Grinnell Mut. Reinsurance
Co. v. Frierdich, 79 Ill. App. 3d 1146, 399 N.E. 2d 252 (1979); Patrons-Oxford Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Dodge, 426 A.2d 888 (Me. 1981); Quincy Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Abernathy, 393 Mass. 81, 469
N.E. 2d 797 (1984); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Hill, 314 N.W.2d 834 (Minn. 1982); Garden
State Fire & Casualty Co. v. Keefe, 172 N.J. Super. 53, 410 A.2d 718 (1980); Eisenman v.
Hornberger, 438 Pa. 46, 264 A.2d 673 (1970); Miller v. Fidelity-Phoenix Ins. Co., 268 S.C. 72,
231 S.E.2d 701 (1977). See also Annotation, Construction and Application of Provision of
Liability Insurance Policy Expressly Excluding Injuries Intended or Expected by Insured, 31
A.L.R. 4th 957 (1984).
Some Florida courts have found exceptions to the majority rule by recognizing certain types
of conduct for which an intent to injure may be inferred as a matter of law. See infra note 284
(involving assault and battery). See also McCullough v. Central Fla. YMCA, 523 So. 2d 1208
(Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1988) (child molestation); Landis v. Allstate Ins. Co., 516 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 3d
D.C.A. 1987); Bosson v. Uderitz, 426 So. 2d 1301 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1983) (robbery); but see
Zordan v. Page, 500 So. 2d 608 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1986) (the intent to harm will not be inferred
as a matter of law in cases involving child molestation unless penetration, violence, or fear
thereof is involved). These courts recognize that this type of criminal activity is usually directed
toward the person of the victim and that some form of harm inheres in and inevitably flows
from the proscribed act. For further discussion of the conflict in the Zordan, Landis, and
McCullough decisions, see infra note 256.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1988

47

Florida Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 3 [1988], Art. 1
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

Thus, the insured must act with specific intent to cause harm to his

7
victim.2 6 The court in Cloud v. Shelby Mutual Insurance Co.2 stated

the rule that an intentional act exclusion clause will not apply unless
the insured acted with specific intent to cause harm to another.2 In
Cloud, the court was confronted with determining whether a clause
that excluded from coverage "bodily injury or property damage caused
intentionally by or at the direction of the insured" applied when the
insured intentionally pushed aside a car and caused injury to a passenger in the pushed car. 59 The insured did not dispute that he intentionally pushed the car, but the insured contended he did not intentionally cause the injuries. 26° The court recognized a majority of courts

256. Zordan v. Page, 500 So. 2d 608 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1986); Greater Palm Beach Symphony
Ass'n, Inc. v. Hughes, 441 So. 2d 1171 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1983); Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Helton, 298
So. 2d 177 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1974); Cloud v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co., 248 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 3d
D.C.A. 1971). There are two recent District Court decisions that are in direct conflict with the

holding in Zordan. In Landis v. Allstate Ins. Co., 516 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1987), the
court was confronted with the issue of whether injuries inflicted by the commission of sexual
battery upon a child falls within the intentional act exclusion. The Landis court held that such
conduct did fall within the exclusion and adopted the reasoning and opinion of the dissent in
Zordan as its own. The court in McCullough v. Central Fla. YMCA, 523 So. 2d 1208 (Fla. 5th
D.C.A. 1988), also affirmed the exclusion of insurance coverage to a child molester citing Landis
as precedent. The McCullough court indicated that in cases involving child molestation "insurance
coverage does not depend on the child molester's 'specific intent' to do or not to do bodily injury
to the child." Id. at 1208. In adopting the reasoning of the dissent in Zordan, the court further
stated that "[r]egardless of the molester's subjective speculation, expectation, or intent to cause
or not to cause bodily injury to a molested child, an intentional act of child molestation of a
criminal character is not an accident." Id. at 1208-09. The dissent in Zordan urges application
of the principle that one intends the natural and probable consequences of his act to child
molestation cases where insurance coverage is an issue. The rule adopted by the dissent requires
that "[i]n construing the 'intentional act' exclusion of liability insurance policies where the underlying claim is that the insured intentionally sexually assaulted the victim, an intention to inflict
injury will be inferred as a matter of law." 500 So. 2d at 613-14 (Frank, J., dissenting) (quoting
Estate of Lehmann By Lehmann v. Metzger, 335 N.W.2d 425, 426 (Minn. 1984)). The conflict
in these decisions is limited to the narrow issue of whether the specific intent to harm the
victim of child molestation will be inferred as a matter of law from the criminal conduct and
must be resolved by the Florida Supreme Court.
257. 248 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1971).
258. The court specifically stated the rule as follows:
The courts have generally held that injury or damage is "caused intentionally"
within the meaning of an "intentional injury exclusion clause" if the insured has
acted with the specific intent to cause harm to a third party, with the result that
the insurer will not be relieved of its obligations under a liability policy containing
such an exclusion unless the insured has acted with such specific intent.
Id. at 218.
259. Id. at 217-18.
260. Id. at 218.
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have ruled that coverage is not excluded as a matter of law under an
intentional act exclusion clause when there was an intentional act but
not an intentionally caused injury.2 61 The court, therefore, held a
genuine issue of material fact existed whether the insured acted with
intent to cause injuries to the passenger; thereby, precluding the entry
of summary judgment.262 The court expressly rejected the argument
that holds a tortfeasor intends the natural and probable consequences
of his act.2 ' The court stated this foreseeability rule does not apply
to cases construing an intentional act exclusion clause in an insurance
policy.24

Florida courts have been unwilling to apply the principle that one
intends the natural and probable consequences of his act to cases
where an insurance policy excludes from coverage injuries that are
intentionally inflicted. The dissenting opinion in Zordan v. Page2
reasoned that to apply the foreseeability rule to intentional act exclusion clauses would, in effect, take away coverage in virtually all
cases.2 6 The majority opinion in Zordan also discussed the difference
between specific and general intent when determining whether coverage exists under an insurance policy containing an intentional act exclusion clause. 267 The court held specific intent to cause harm can only
exist where the insured subjectively intended the result of his act. 268

261. Id.
262. Id. at 219.
263. Id. at 218.
264. Id.
265. 500 So. 2d at 613 (Frank, J., dissenting). The reasoning of the dissent in Zordan was
approved and adopted in two recent decisions which hold that the intentional act exclusion does
apply as a matter of law to child molesters. See McCullough v. Central Fla. YMCA, 523 So.
2d 1208 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1988); Landis v. Allstate Ins. Co., 516 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 3d D.C.A.
1987). Both of these cases are in direct conflict with the majority decision in Zordan. For further
discussion of these cases, see supra note 256 and accompanying text.
266. Judge Frank, in his dissenting opinion, states the reason Florida courts do not apply
the foreseeability rule to intentional act exclusion clauses as follows:
The logic underlying rejection of the "reasonably foreseeable consequences" rule
in insurance policies excluding intentional torts derives from the notion that injuries
occur from a vast array of intentional acts but if such injuries were deemed foreseeable, they, too, would be intentional and hence there would be no coverage.
Id. at 613.
267. Id. at 609.
268. The Zordan majority explained the difference between specific intent and general
intent as follows:
Specific intent is in contrast to general intent. While a person may have the general
intent to injure someone from an act which he intended to commit because his
general intent to cause the natural result of that act may be presumed whether
or not he subjectively intended to inflict the injury, in general he may not be found
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In Zordan, the insured was sued for damages for intentional injuries
caused by his alleged sexual fondling of his fourteen year old stepgranddaughter.2 The complaint also alleged the injuries were neither
intended nor expected by the insured.? ° The insurer argued the injuries were intentional, and no insurance coverage existed pursuant
to an intentional act exclusion clause that excluded coverage for
liability arising from injuries that the insured intended or expected.- 1
The trial court agreed with the insurer and issued summary judgment
holding there was no coverage. 2 The appellate court reversed and
held the law in Florida requires a determination of the insured's subjective intent, and there was no evidence to show what was the insured's subjective intent.2
In a similar case, the court held in Phoenix Insurance Co. v.
Helton ' 4 that the intentional act exclusion clause did not apply where
the insured, while attempting to disperse a crowd with his car, accidentally and unintentionally injured a member of the crowd. In Grange
Mutual Casualty Co. v. Thomas,rr5 the court similarly held the intentional act exclusion clause did not apply when the insured intended
to shoot one person but unintentionally shot a bystander. Another
court examined this line of cases in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v.
Spreen.-- The court noted that in each case an act of negligence was
committed, but it was never established that the insured's act was
deliberately designed to cause harm to the victim.27

to have had the specific intent to cause that result unless he can be found to have
subjectively intended the result.
Id.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 608-09. Insurers argued injuries were not subjectively intended, but that intent
to injure could be presumed from intent to act and fall within the intentional injury exclusion.
272. Id. at 609.
273. Id. at 609-10.
274. 298 So. 2d 177 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1974).
275. 301 So. 2d 158 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1974). The court stated the applicable general rule is
that "unless the wrongful act complained of is intentionally directed specifically toward the
person injured by such act, the injury, as to that victim, is an accident or 'occurrence' for which
an insured tortfeasor may become legally answerable in damages as contemplated by the coverage
...

of his... liability policy." Id. at 159.

276. 343 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1977).
277. The court's observations about the cases cited were stated as follows:
The Florida courts in a line of cases have consistently held that insurance policies
covering liability for an "accident" apply to any bodily injury or property damage
inflicted by the insured on a third party where the insured does not intend to
cause any harm to the third party; this result obtains even though damages are
caused by the insured's intentional acts and were reasonably foreseeable by the
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The court in Spreen was confronted with the revised policy language that excluded from coverage "bodily injury and property damage
that is either expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured." The insured deliberately hit his victim for making a crude
and insulting remark about the insured's wife. 9 The victim ified suit
against the insured alleging damages resulting from assault and battery and also negligence.2 The insured admitted he intended to strike
his victim in the face, but he did not intend to damage the victim's
face or eye.2 1 The court held foreseeability of the extent of the injuries
is irrelevant to the issue of coverage under a policy containing an
intentional act exclusion clause.2 The court stated, 'the sole issue is
whether Spreen intended to inflict any harm on King. This he clearly
intended to do and the fact that he did not foresee or intend the extent
of the harm inflicted does not convert the admitted assault and battery
into an accident."'' A multitude of Florida cases hold an assault and
battery committed by the insured is an intentional tort, which is not
Thus,
covered by insurance policies insuring against an accident.
to
cause
intent
specific
with
the issue of whether the insured acted
injury is a factual matter to be determined by the trier of fact.2
2.

The Misidentity Exception

Florida courts apply the intentional act exclusion clause when the
insured is unaware of the identity of his victim, yet he intended to
Running through all of these cases is an act of negligence by the
insured ....
insured, sometimes gross or even culpable negligence. But never has coverage
been found under such policies where the insured's act was deliberately designed
to cause harm to the injured party.
Id. at 650-51.
278. Id. at 650.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 651-52.
283. Id. at 651.
284. See State Farm & Casualty Co. v. Saurazas, 334 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1976);
Capoferri v. Allstate Ins. Co., 322 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1975); Buchwald v. Hartford
Accident & Indem. Co., 319 So. 2d 164 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1975); Consolidated Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Ivy Liquors, Inc., 105 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1966). See also Ladas v. Aetna Ins. Co., 416
So. 2d 21 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1982) (the court held that there is no coverage for assault and battery
under a personal excess insurance policy that did provide coverage for certain enumerated
intentional torts, assault and battery not being enumerated, and where the policy also contained
an intentional tort exclusion that provided that coverage shall not apply "to any act committed
by or at the direction of the insured with intent to cause personal injury or property damage").
285. Zordan v. Page, 500 So. 2d 608 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1986); Greater Palm Beach Symphony
Ass'n, Inc. v. Hughes, 441 So. 2d 1171 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1983).
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cause injury or harm to the person of his victim. In Peters v.

Trousclair,2 the insured was a riverboat pilot, which required that
he spend extended periods of time away from his home and his wife.
After his return from an extended absence, the insured found an
individual residing in his house who had become amorously involved
with his wife. Also residing in the house at the insured's invitation
was the wife's cousin, Peters, whom the insured had only met on two
prior occasions. When the insured returned home and found his wife
with two men in his house, he went into a jealous rage.2 9 The insured
did not recognize Peters, and stabbed him repeatedly causing serious
injury.m Once the insured realized Peters was his wife's cousin, he
immediately delivered him to the hospital.291 Peters filed criminal
charges against the insured, and instituted civil proceedings alleging
intentional and negligent acts.2 The court held the intentional act
exclusion clause contained in the insured's insurance policy applied,
and denied coverage.2 3 The court held that even though the insured
was unaware "of the identity of Peters as being his wife's cousin,
knowledge which might have otherwise stayed his hand, the act was
nonetheless intentionally, specifically directed towards the person of
Peters."2

3. The Insanity Exception
The issue has arisen regarding the effect the insured's insanity
would have on the applicability of an intentional act exclusion clause.
Florida courts first addressed that issue in George v. Stone, wherein
the plaintiff, a physician, was shot and injured by the insured. The
defendant, Allstate Insurance Company, had issued an insurance policy
to the insured which provided that coverage did not apply to any
injury caused intentionally by the insured.2 The plaintiff claimed this
exclusionary clause did not apply because the insured was insane at
the time of the shooting.2 Reversing a summary judgment entered

286.
287.

431 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1983).
Id. at 297.

288.
289.

Id.
Id.

290.

Id.

291.

Id.

292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.

Id.
Id. at 298.
Id. at 297.
260 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1972).
Id. at 260-61.
Id. at 261.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol40/iss3/1

52

Sawaya: Use of Criminal Convictions in Subsequent Civl Proceedings: Statu
STATUTORY COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL

in favor of Allstate, the court held an intentional act exclusion clause
does not apply to injuries inflicted by a person who is found to be
insane at the time the act occurred.m
Since the decision in George, Florida courts have consistently held
an insane individual cannot commit an intentional act within the meaning of an intentional act exclusion clause.2
4. The Self-Defense Exception
Some insureds have tried to establish necessary self defense as an
exception to an intentional act exclusion clause. In Clemmons v. American States Insurance Co.," the court considered whether injuries
inflicted by an insured acting in necessary self defense are intentional
injuries within the meaning of liability policy provisions that exclude
coverage for bodily injury intended from the insured's standpoint. The
decedent's estate filed a wrongful death action against the insured and
his insurance carrier.- °1 The insurance company pled as an affirmative
defense those policy provisions that exclude coverage for bodily injury
intended from the insured's standpoint.m The insured put necessary
self defense in issue when he testified his intent was to keep the
decedent from shooting him. 303 In affirming a directed verdict in favor
of the insurer, the court held injuries inflicted by an insured acting
in necessary self defense are intentional injuries that fall within the
meaning of the intentional act exclusion clause. 3°4

298. The court stated the rule as follows:
In the instant case, we determine that where the tortfeasor's mental state is such
that he may be deemed insane, in the accepted legal sense of the word, the better
rule is that an injury caused by an insured while in that condition cannot be
considered to have been caused feloniously and intentionally within the connotation
of the words as used in an intentional injury exclusion clause.
Id. at 262.
299. Northland Ins. Co. v. Mautino, 433 So. 2d 1225 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1983); Arkwright-Boston Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dunkel, 363 So. 2d 190 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1978).
300. 412 So. 2d 906 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1982).
301. Id. at 907.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. In holding that injuries inflicted by an insured while acting in self-defense may be
intentional within the meaning of an intentional act exclusion clause, the court reasoned that:
Morally and under criminal law concepts, when each intentionally caused bodily
injuries to another by intentionally shooting him, each acted within their insurance
policy exclusion, notwithstanding that the ultimate purpose of each was to accomplish a distant objective or goal quite beyond and detached from the intended
act of shooting and the immediate obvious result of thereby inflicting serious bodily
harm.
Id. at 910.
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5. Types of Criminal Intent Statutes
The' primary consideration in determining if an intentional act exclusion clause applies is whether the insured had the subjective, specific intent to cause any harm to his victim. Therefore, one can argue
those convicted of criminal activity causing the injury or harm can
presumably have acted with the requisite intent. However, courts
generally do not conclusively establish the insured's intent as it relates
to the applicability of an intentional act exclusion simply because a
prior criminal conviction has been established. 0 5 Courts allow inquiry
into the insured's intent in accordance with the principles set forth
above. 3 0 This inquiry usually entails review of the particular criminal
statute the insured was convicted of violating to determine whether
the statute sets forth the insured's intent as a necessary element of
the crime.3 7 Therefore, a brief discussion of the categories of criminal
statutes relating to the convicted criminal's intent is appropriate.
Despite the common law requirement that all crimes consist of an
act or omission coupled with a requisite mental intent or mens rea,
it was established long ago that the legislature has the power to
dispense with the element of intent and punish particular acts without
regard to the offender's mental attitude.m Therefore, three broad
categories of criminal statutes developed.
The first category is commonly referred to as "strict liability"
crimes. These are criminal violations even if committed without the
intent to do the prohibited act.-" Examples of strict liability crimes
310
are driving under the influence, manslaughter, and statutory rape.
Because this category makes the offender's intent irrelevant, one may
argue the intentional act exclusion does not apply because the act may
have been committed without intent to commit the crime or without
knowledge that the activity was criminal.
The second category is commonly referred to as "general intent"
crimes. A general intent criminal statute prohibits either a voluntary

305. See supra note 235 and accompanying text. There are however, exceptions where the
courts, in construing the intentional act exclusion clause in insurance policies, will infer from

the criminal conduct that the specific intent to injure or harm the victim exists as a matter of
law. See supra note 255 and accompanying text.
306. See supra note 305 and accompanying text.
307. Id.
308. State v. Gray, 435 So. 2d 816 (Fla. 1983); State v. Oxx, 417 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 5th
D.C.A. 1982).
309. Baker v. State, 377 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1979); Linehan v. State, 442 So. 2d 244 (2d D.C.A.
1983), rnodfied, 476 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 1985).
310. See supra note 309 and accompanying text.
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act or that which is substantially certain to result from the act.311 The
subjective intent to cause the particular result is irrelevant to this
category of crime. The law ascribes to the actor a presumption that
he intended such a result, reasoning a person intends the necessary
and natural consequences of his act. 321 However, courts have explicitly
rejected this reasoning when determining whether an intentional act
exclusion clause applies.313 Therefore, one may argue that no specific
intent to cause harm is required to prove that the particular crime
was committed. Thus, evidence other than the commission of a crime
must be produced to show the specific intent of the offender when
this category of crime is involved. In United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Co. v. Perez,314 the insured was convicted of the general
intent crime of second degree murder and the insurer denied coverage
under an intentional act exclusion clause. The court held coverage
existed for the killing of the decedent because there was no showing
the insured intended to harm or kill the decedent. 315 Other examples
of general intent crimes are attempted second degree murder,316
rape, 31 7 manslaughter,318 possession of methaqualudes,39 resisting arrest with violence,m and passing forged bank checks.32 1
The third category is commonly referred to as "specific intent"
crimes. A specific intent statute requires an intent to do the proscribed
act coupled with an intent to cause a particular result in addition to
that which is a natural and necessary consequence of the act.32 2 Therefore, this category of crime requires a subjective intent to cause a
result in addition to that result which is substantially certain to occur
from the criminal conduct.m An example of this category of crime is
set forth in Florida's robbery statute, which was the subject of the
court's consideration in Bosson v. Uderitz. The insured stole the
victim's purse, and injured the victim as the insured attempted to

311.

Linehan, 442 So. 2d at 244.

312. Id.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.

Cloud v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co., 248 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1971).
384 So. 24 904 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1980).
Id. at 905.
Gentry v. State, 437 So. 2d 1097 (Fla. 1983).
Askew v. State, 118 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 1960).
Folks v. State, 85 Fla. 288, 95 So. 619 (1923).
Link v. State, 429 So. 24 836 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1983).
illiams v. State, 250 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1971).
Crusoe v. State, 239 So. 2d 147 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1970).
Linehan v. State, 442 So. 2d 244 (2d D.C.A. 1983), modified, 476 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 1985).

323. Id.
324. 426 So. 2d 1301 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1983).
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drive away.32 The court examined the robbery statute and found the
acts were intentional within the meaning of that statute, and held the
intentional act exclusion clause applied precluding coverage under the
policy.3 6 Other examples of specific intent crimes are first degree
murder,5 breaking and entering with intent to commit a misdemeanor,m burglary,m robbery,30 aggravated battery,3 1 aggravated
assault,m battery,m and battery on a police officer. 34
6. Practice Pointers
The practitioner should first examine the particular criminal statute
the insured was convicted of violating to determine whether the crime
is a strict liability, general intent, or specific intent crime. Since the
issue of the individual's specific intent is not relevant to prove the
commission of a crime falling within the first two categories of criminal
statutes, the fact that the insured had been convicted of one of those
categories would not establish proof of the insured's specific intent.
However, the specific intent crimes require proof of the insured's
specific intent in order to obtain a conviction of that category of crime.
Courts have used the violation of that type of criminal statute as
establishing a presumption of the insured's specific intent to cause
harm. When the proscribed activity is directed towards the person of
the victim, some courts have held the specific intent will be inferred
as a matter of law.1 Whether courts will presume the specific intent
to harm exists or infer the intent as a matter of law will be decided
on a case-by-case basis. If the courts presume that specific intent
exists, such presumption should not be conclusive. Courts should allow
inquiry into all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the incident
to determine the insured's subjective intent.

325. Id. at 1302.
326. Id.
327. Edwards v. State, 428 So. 2d 357 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1983).
328. Jenkins v. State, 58 Fla. 62, 50 So. 582 (1909).
329. Heathcoat v. State, 430 So. 2d 945 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1983).
330. Graham v. State, 406 So. 2d 503 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1981).
331. Heathcoat, 430 So. 2d at 945.
332. Id. See also Williams v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., 419 So. 2d 766 (Fla. 1st
D.C.A. 1982).
333. Harris v. State, 415 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1982).
334. Mellins v. State, 395 So. 2d 1207 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1981).
335.

McCullough v. Central Fla. YMCA, 523 So. 2d 1208 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1988); Landis

v. Allstate Ins. Co., 516 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1987). See also Bosson v. Uderitz, 426 So.
2d 1301 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1983). But see Zordan v. Page, 500 So. 2d 608 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1986).
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When the specific intent to cause harm is an issue in determining
the applicability of the intentional act exclusion clause, the evidence
presented at trial should delve into the acts committed by the insured
that caused the injuries. The court should consider the nature and
surrounding circumstances of the acts, how they were committed, and
the nature and extent of the injuries that resulted.3 6
C.

The Minority Rule

A minority of courts adopt the rule that when an intentional act
is committed by the insured resulting in injuries that are a natural
and probable result, the injuries are intentional for purposes of determining the applicability of an intentional act exclusion clause.3 7 These
courts apply the classic tort doctrine that one intends the natural and
probable consequences of his acts, and presume the insured intended
those results.ms
In Casualty ReciprocalExchange v. Thomas,33the court was confronted with an intentional act exclusion clause that provided the policy
did not apply to bodily injury that was neither expected nor intended
from the insured's standpoint. The issue of the insurer's duty to defend
was put before the court pursuant to a complaint for declaratory
judgment.340 The court stated the minority rule that where the insured
commits an intentional act resulting in injuries, and those injuries are
a natural and probable result of that act, then those injuries are
intentional for purposes of determining the applicability of the intentional act exclusion clause.11 The court noted this is a rebuttable
presumption.
One aberrant Florida decision relates to the applicability of the
intentional act exclusion clause. In West Building Materials, Inc. v.
Allstate Insurance Co.,m a young boy ignited a smoke bomb in a

336. See Zo'tdan, 500 So. 2d at 608.
337. Armstrong v. Security Ins. Group, 292 Ala. 27, 288 So. 2d 134 (1973); Casualty Reciprocal Exch. v. Thomas, 7 Kan. App. 2d 718, 647 P.2d 1361 (1982); Northwestern Nat'l Casualty
Co. v. Phalen, 182 Mont. 448, 597 P.2d 720 (1979); Vittum v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 117
N.H. 1, 369 A.2d 184 (1977); Hins v. Heer, 259 N.W.2d 38 (N.D. 1977); Argonaut S.W. Ins.
Co. v. Maupin, 500 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. 1973); Norma v. Insurance Co. of N.A., 218 Va. 718, 239
S.E.2d 902 (1978).
338. See supra note 337 and accompanying text.
339. 7 Kan. App. 2d 718, 647 P.2d 1361 (1982).
340. Id. at 1362, 7 Kan. App. 2d at 718.
341. Id. at 1364, 7 Kan. App. 2d at 721.
342. Id.
343. 363 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1978).
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building that caused the building to catch fire. Allstate successfully
argued its intentional act exclusion clause applied because as the court
stated, "ignition of the bomb was the natural, probable, and intended
result of Keith's act."' Even though the court's decision utilized language that mirrored the reasoning employed by courts adopting the
minority rule, the facts of the instant case match the results of the
Florida cases that adopt the majority rule. The majority rule would
have found the insured intended some harm by smoke damage. The
West decision consists of a single paragraph, and to the extent it is
inconsistent with the principles set forth in the other Florida cases
adopting the majority rule, it is an aberration. This is the same conclusion reached by the court in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Steinemer,14
which criticized the opinion as being unsound.
VI.

THE CIVIL REMEDIES FoR CRIMINAL PRACTICES ACT

Florida's Civil Remedies for Criminal Practices Act' 6 became effective on October 1, 1986.3 7 This Act contains collateral estoppel provi-

sions in Florida Statutes section 772.14,3 which provides that:
A final judgment or decree rendered in favor of the state in
any criminal proceeding concerning the conduct of the defendant which forms the basis for a civil cause of action under
this chapter, or in any criminal proceeding under chapter
895, shall estop the defendant in any action brought pursuant
to this chapter as to all matters as to which such judgment
or decree would be an estoppel as if the plaintiff had been
a party in the criminal action.
The legislature was apparently concerned with the plight of the
crime victim injured by the type of activity proscribed by the Act.
Therefore, the Act gives collateral estoppel effect to a prior final
judgment or decree rendered in favor of the state and against the
offender. This obviates the necessity of proving the convicted criminal's
liability in the civil suit brought under the Act. The legislature also

344. Id. at 399.
345. 723 F.2d 873 (11th Cir. 1984).
346. FLA. STAT. §§ 772.101-.19 (Supp. 1986).
347. 1986 Fla. Laws 2036, 2041, ch. 86277, § 9 states that "this Act shall apply to all civil
proceedings commenced on or after October 1, 1986, provided that Sections 1, 2, 5, and 7 shall
apply to all civil proceedings pending on October 1, 1986, provided that Sections 1, 2, 5, and 7
shall apply to all civil proceedings pending on October 1, 1986, for which a distribution of
proceeds under FLA. STAT. § 895.09, has yet to be determined." Id.
348.

FLA. STAT. § 772.14 (1987).
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wanted to ensure, to the extent possible, that the convicted criminal
does not profit from his crime. However, before the collateral estoppel
provisions of the Act apply, certain requisites must be met. 9
A primary requirement is that a criminal judgment or decree must
be rendered in favor of the state.3s This particular language raises
questions of interpretation. The legislature intended that a final judgment or decree finding the defendant guilty should be sufficient to
trigger the use of the statute. When a court withholds adjudication
of guilt, the question arises whether this is a final judgment or decree
rendered in favor of the state. It can be argued that a judgment or
decree withholding adjudication of guilt is one rendered in favor of
the state especially if it is rendered pursuant to a plea of guilty or
no contest, or a jury verdict finding guilt. Further, had the legislature
intended to restrict operation of the collateral estoppel provisions to
cases where the court actually adjudicated the defendant guilty of the
crime, the legislature could easily have included language to that effect. Therefore, convincing arguments support the position that final
judgments or decrees withholding adjudication of guilt are sufficient
to trigger operation of the statute. This position is strengthened when
considered with the legislative objectives in enacting the collateral
estoppel provisions of the Act, namely to protect the rights of the
injured crime victim and to ensure that the criminal does not profit
from his crime.
One must also establish the criminal proceedings concern conduct
of the defendant that forms the basis for a civil cause of action under
the Act or under Florida Statutes chapter 895 relating to racketeering
and illegal debts.- 1 In order to establish a cause of action under the

.349. Id.
350. Id.
351. Id. Florida's Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO) Act, FLA. STAT.
§§ 895.01-.06 (1987), was enacted by the Florida legislature to resist and eliminate the infiltration
of organized crime into the state. The legislature recognized that "organized crime is . . .
corrupting legitimate business operating within this state" which will "harm innocent investors,
entrepreneurs, merchants, and consumers, and thereby constitute a substantial danger to the
economic and general welfare of the State of Florida." 1977 Fla. Laws 1400, ch. 77334. The
legislature saw the need to provide those adversely affected by organized crime with new
criminal and civil remedies and procedures that fight organized crime in this state, and also
assist those victimized by such criminal activity in recovering their losses. Therefore, the legislature enacted FLA. STAT. § 895.05(8) (1987) containing collateral estoppel provisions, which
state that "a final judgment or decree rendered in favor of the state in any criminal proceedings
under this act shall estop the defendant in any subsequent civil action or proceeding as to all
matters as to which such judgment or decree would be an estoppel as between the parties."
Id. The provisions of this statute are very similar to those contained in the Civil Remedies for
Criminal Practices Act, FLA. STAT. § 772.14 (1986), and also in Florida's Anti-Fencing Act,
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Act, one must prove by clear and convincing evidence that he has
been injured by reason of any violation of Florida Statutes section
772.103.352
Once the aggrieved party establishes a cause of action under the
Act, the collateral estoppel provisions contained therein estop the
defendant from denying all matters regarding a final judgment or
decree rendered in favor of the state "as if the plaintiff had been a
party in the criminal action." This quoted language is in direct response to those Florida decisions that uphold the mutuality rule and
refuse to give collateral estoppel effect to prior criminal convictions
in subsequent civil proceedings.A5The legislature declared the mutuality rule will no longer be a barrier to giving collateral estoppel effect
to final judgments or decrees rendered in favor of the state relating
to criminal activity proscribed by the Act. With the liability issue
virtually established by the final judgment or decree entered in the
prior criminal proceedings, the only issue the aggrieved party must
litigate will be damages. However, in the event a verdict or adjudication of not guilty is rendered in favor of the defendant or any other
person whose conduct forms the basis of a claim under the Act, the
verdict or judgment shall be admissible into evidence but it shall not
act as an estoppel against the plaintiff.m
VII.

CONCLUSION

Congress and the Florida legislature have clearly articulated the
popular will that the rights of the crime victim be protected. That
FLA. STAT. § 812.035(8) (1987). For the pertinent provisions of Florida's Anti-Fencing Act, see
FLA. STAT. § 812.012-.037 (1987). The Anti-Fencing Act was enacted by the legislature in 1977
"as part of the overall revision of the criminal statutes relating to theft and stolen property."
State v. Allen, 362 So. 2d 10, 11 n.2 (Fla. 1978). The Act is designed to encompass a broad
range of activities that includes trafficking in stolen property and theft. Roush v. State, 413
So. 2d 15 (Fla. 1982). The Act includes not only criminal penalties for violation of its provisions,
but also civil remedies, which provides the state with effective tools to stop the proscribed
activity. Id. The Act also gives aggrieved citizens the statutory authority to recover for losses
incurred as a result of the various forms of theft committed against their property. Id. The
legislature enacted FLA. STAT. § 812.035(8) (1987) to assist the state and private citizens
pursuing civil remedies for violation of the Act. FLA. STAT. § 812.035(8) (1987) contains a
collateral estoppel provision, which provides as follows:
A final judgment or decree rendered in favor of the state in any criminal proceedings
under §§ 812.012-812.037 or § 812.081 shall estop the defendant in any subsequent
civil action or proceeding as to all matters as to which such judgment or decree
would be an estoppel as between the parties.
352.

See FLA. STAT. §§ 772.103-.104 (1987).

353. FLA. STAT. § 772.14 (1987).
354. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
355. FLA. STAT. § 772.15 (1987).
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goal has been partially achieved through the enactment of the collateral
estoppel provisions of the VWPA and the Civil Remedies for Criminal
Practices Act. Not only will the criminal proceedings ensure that restitution be made to the victim, but the avenues available to victims
for further redress against the convicted criminal through civil proceedings have been greatly expanded. The victim will have a far
greater chance of success in the civil courts, and the effort and resources he must expend to achieve the desired results will substantially
decrease. The issues will be limited primarily to the damages sustained
by the victim, and the possibilities of settlement of all issues will be
greatly enhanced. This will result in a savings of time and money for
the victim, and increase the potential for large settlement and damage
awards.
Before the victim proceeds with civil litigation, he must first assess
his chances of collecting any civil judgment. This may depend on
whether the convicted criminal has insurance coverage. The victim's
counsel must be prepared to respond to the insurance company's certain defense based on the intentional act exclusion clause. This may
create the unusual circumstance of the victim and the defendant being
aligned against the insurance company to protect the victim's interest
of finding a deep pocket for recovery as well as the defendant's interest
in having any potential judgment paid by the insurer rather than
himself.
The Florida legislature has also indicated its willingness to follow
the modern trend towards abandoning, at least in part, the mutuality
doctrine. Given this clear signal from the legislature, perhaps now the
Florida Supreme Court will consider modifying its rigid stance of total
adherence to the mutuality rule. Should the court decide to follow the
modern view, all types of civil remedies may be affected by the increased application of the common law doctrine of collateral estoppel.
The goal of protecting the victim through the collateral estoppel
provisions of the statutes can only be achieved if they are utilized.
Because this area of the law is relatively new and untested, those
involved with our judicial system need to be educated about the existence and effect of these statutes. This article is intended to be a
stimulus for making all concerned with our judicial system more aware
of the potential use of these statutory provisions. In so doing, full
effect can be given to the policies and goals established by our legislature and Congress of protecting the rights and needs of the victims
of crime.
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